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“Life left us all where we were meant to be or where it was convenient to leave us and then forgot
us, which is as it should be.” Roberto Bolaño, The Savage Detective
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Introduction: All These Events Really Happened
“Covert operations are important, illegal manipulations of society done secretly”1
John Whitten, CIA official

Mexico’s relations, within academic contexts of historical cause and effect changes over
time, tend to stem from its association with overtly imperialist overlords. These ranged from
Spain to the United States, to a revolving door of Mexican-born, invader caudillos that assumed
power through violent uprisings from the early 19th century to the early 20th century.2 Once the
record of these tumultuous phases passed through the digestive system of academics and
amateur historians alike, Mexico slowly took a backdrop to the geopolitical powerhouses of
World War II and the Cold War. The state became “an exceptional country”,3 achieving
authoritarian civilian control by 1950.4 Perceptions of active conflict dictate the focus of typical
foreign policy, regardless of its overt or covert nature. This in turn has the potential to shape the
general framework of assimilating and pureeing information for the masses. Mexico in particular
has had a corybantic and varied history – from its inception at the hands of Spanish rapists and
murderers, like Hernando Cortés, up until the present, in which the Mexican general election
between José Antonio Meade and Ricardo Anaya Cortés is set for 1 July, 2018. What these
invasions have in common is an outright military presence, imparted throughout the regions of
Mexico, and a standard assumption of occupation. Far less well-known, however, is the
invasion of covert intelligence agencies at the highest levels of government. New CIA files have
proven that three Mexican presidents – López Mateos, Díaz Ordaz, and Echeverría Álvarez –
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were official informants (including during their tenures as cabinet appointees) of the United
States Central Intelligence Agency under the direction of station chief Winston Scott.5
One factor that is especially pertinent, though not necessarily limited, to a United States
stratagem is proximity. Broadly speaking, as a geographic entity, Mexico is situated in prime
locale – for northern or southern invasions, as a fulcrum for the operations of nations, or for
independent rebellious groups to stockpile assets in order to trigger explosions of radical
ideology. Despite its total size of 758,450 square miles,6 modern Mexico, defined as the time
during and after the consolidation of the party-state in 1929, somehow remained exempt from
the Cold War norms of rampant military juntas sponsored by clandestine U.S. forces. Adapting
this mindset all but excluded Mexico from having any agency during the Cold War, whilst
retrospectively diminishing the role of its earlier modern state formation in the early 1930s,
which had encompassed external U.S. pressures for oil; internal pressures from Japan with
regards to oil and natural resources, and from Germany7 with regards to manipulating Mexico
with Nazi propaganda to force an alignment with Axis powers. Although Nazi propaganda and
Japanese trade deals did induce successful independent bilateral relationships in the short
term, their very presence, together with the actions taken by the Mexican Government, belies a
party-state mentality that climaxed in the early 1970s. This was all made possible through
extensive conceptual application of saccadic masking8 in which – because there was no
symbolic structure of Japanese or German power – movement and propagation of their
respective economic–political agendas were left relatively unhampered and unobscured.

5

Morley., 90-91
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This phenomenon additionally allows one to understand precisely why the Mexican
Government denied the U.S. Government permission to build any military bases in Mexico, as
this symbolic manifestation of U.S. imperialism would hark back to the 1847 seizure of Mexico
City and the amputation of fifty percent of Mexican territory9 through the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, and later the 1914-17 occupation of Veracruz.10 The dichotomous relations built by the
Mexican state with foreign parties appears, upon further inspection, more akin to a business
tycoon strengthening his Fortune 500 company; the most flagrant examples of a CEO behavior
being demonstrated during the respective sexennios of Miguel Alemán and Luis Echeverría
Álvarez. Overt policy became the mask of verisimilitude, while covert action embodied the policy
of truth. While this is not necessarily revelatory information within the grand scheme of
governmental operation, when placing this concept within the period of Mexico’s more stable
state formation between 1929 and 1946,11 it not only imparts agency to Mexico’s sovereignty –
that power to enforce laws – but accordingly dictates a somewhat paradoxical modus operandi
that might have reduced its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism. How then, would
an idiosyncratic entity like the iterations of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI),
espousing rhetoric that claims a commitment to uphold nationalist revolutionary ideals,
eventually fall victim to a direct, covert, invasion by both intelligence branches – namely the CIA
and FBI – of a neighboring foreign power between 1950 and 1970? The most uninvolved
answer is self-preservation, but when one attempts to tear away the layers of deception, a
cesspool of major themes resurfaces under the umbrella of compartmentalization: the very
definition of sovereignty in the age of espionage; the politics of how primary sources are
revealed and used and the extent to which this history cannot be taught, the degree to which the

9

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Mexican-American War." Encyclopædia Britannica. February
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Mexican state enjoyed autonomy with respect to its national and international relationships, not
only with the U.S. but with other Latin American nations like Cuba from 1946 to 1970; the
degree to which the Mexican state consented to international alliances that might have reduced
its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism; and the ways in which international
relationships and significant events that occurred in Mexico had wider global impacts than have
been previously known, expected, or assumed. This investigation will attempt to unravel who
really governed Mexico during this time period: the President of Mexico; the Mexican state
(PRI); the Mexican national defense force, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS); the U.S.
State Department; or its intelligence agencies , the FBI or CIA.
Simply beginning in 1950 is insufficient to understand the magnitude of elements
operating at once; similarly in 1946, when the PRI was officially founded. One must begin in the
early 1930s in order to pinpoint patterns of behavior, identifying Mexico’s broader political
physiological disposition as a post-revolutionary state within the fabric of draconian global
change, in an attempt to iron out the motivations of an establishment that somehow asserted
and balanced three distinct positions in an ultimate act of agency representing present, future,
and past. These were: neutrality as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); procapitalist favoring of the highest bidder; and pro-nationalistic support of sovereign, independent
international relations – perhaps harking back the rebellions of Mexico’s past. This is especially
poignant as a reaction to the aggressive 19th century U.S, Monroe Doctrine,12 which was thus
supplemented by an ascending “concept of hemispheric defense, based on promoting military
cooperation between all nations of the Western Hemisphere in order to repel external
aggression”13 in the wake of fascist populism in Europe and Japan. However, Mexico, in a truly
magnificent act of agency in 1937 and 1938, expropriated both railroads and oil industries from
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eager American investors,14 allowing Lázaro Cárdenas the ability to freely renegotiate trade
deals. This, coupled with the emergence of Nazi agents in Mexico City, not only blindsided the
U.S. State Department, but concurrently placed bargaining chips in Cárdenas’s hands in relation
to economic–political deals with both the United States and Axis forces. During the years 1940
and 1941, the Mexican Government initiated a vital move for a greater degree of bilateralism
with the U.S., which not only constrained movement of U.S. military officials,15 but also “resisted
the establishment of U.S. military bases on its territory...and rejected the possibility of a joint
military command, which would have implied the deployment of U.S. troops on Mexican soil as
well as the subordination of the Mexican Army to a U.S. officer.”16 This brazen defiance of U.S.
advances demonstrates a deftness and heightened awareness on Mexico’s behalf of its
diplomatic position, and of U.S. desperation in the face of war, which allowed Mexico the
latitude to impose restrictions against patent intrusions of its imperialist neighbor. Mexican
statesmen were able to unearth the political pressure points of the U.S. in its most difficult times
and manipulate outcomes based around this. “Mexico developed its negotiating skills, taking
advantage of the fears and the security needs of its powerful neighbor. For the first time Mexico
enjoyed a certain leverage over the United States.”17
If junctures of war create opportunities for individuals to climb socio-political ladders,
one could reason that the same logic applies on an exponentially larger scale, such as to an
entire country. Mexico’s vociferous lineage of military coup d’états dating back to the 1820s,
substantial concern about the one-party state refinement process and military subjugation – or
rather the fear of increased “military-politico” power18 – denied Mexico under President Avila
Camacho the equal footing with the U.S. it expected. Paz notes that a particular climate echoed
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in Mexican relations with the U.S., in which “Mexican authorities had an underlying fear that the
army and the navy could acquire political power through their dealings with the United States.”19
Thus two substantial shifts in governmental machinery took place in the wake of both Mexican
and U.S. fears.
First, because Mexico – with its immense natural resources and immense stonewalling
of American military expansion – was ascending to its place on the geopolitical table, the U.S.
Government had to revise its strategy, shifting to bolster the work of the “Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), [which] competed for leverage in the intelligence field with J. Edgar Hoover,
head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)”,20 which served more sinister functions than
merely attempting to indirectly influence Mexico’s foreign policy. These agencies, including the
Military Intelligence Division (MID) discreetly wove themselves into directly influencing domestic
Mexican elections from 1940 onwards. As Aaron Navarro claims, “[a]s the United States
attempted to maintain official neutrality in the Mexican presidential contests, debate raged over
which candidate, Almazan or Amaro or Avila Camacho, would best serve U.S. interests in the
long run.”21 On the other hand, the Mexican PRM, over the course of a 20 year span between
1930 and 1950, chronically afraid of cracks in their castle of glass, effectively accomplished
what most countries have been unable to do: “Bring the military under firm civilian control,
transform it into a more professional fighting force, and effectively scotch the political aspirations
of the officer class, all the while reducing the percentage of GDP spent on national defense”22 in
order to focus on strengthening the ruling PRM/PRI through constructions of opposition.23 The
lynchpin of this Mexican transition of defense budget allocation was the development of the
covert fighting force, the DFS. Perhaps one could argue that the shift from overt military power
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to the covert preeminence of intelligence services was merely a product of the transition of
World War II into the Cold War, but this reason alone is at best tenuous24 as the United States
retained one of the largest militaries in the world as a containment force under the Truman
Doctrine,25 fighting in the Korean War during the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and
70s. This is not to say that Mexican interests were not invested in overt military defense, but
rather this was a tool that later reemerged with their insistence on the nationalization of oil.26
A strong argument must be made for Mexico’s rising interest in the international arena.
With the direct threat of the U.S. looming large to the north, the perceived virus of fascism
during the 30s and 40s, and then communism in the latter half of the 20th century, “[t]his
decision was emblematic of the transition of the intelligence services from indirect to overt
agents of the political agenda of the president and, by extension, the dominant Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). This shift, accelerated by growing budgets and foreign
training, made the intelligence community itself a prime tool for subverting, co-opting, or
destroying electoral opposition to the political elite.”27 Although the impending American threat
was indeed omniscient and somewhat infinite, the era-appropriate international ideological time
bombs bestowed Mexico with the opportunity to prove its tripartite balancing act of
“exceptionalism” and saccadic masking, in dealing with Japanese and German28 foreign
nationals, while also fending off the U.S. during the golden age of fascism from the mid-1930s
until the end of World War II in 1945. In fact, the origins of the Mexican party-state as a

24
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“business state” might even have most corporeal significance “[b]efore [World War II], and from
a strictly legal point of view, [as] there were no grounds for banning Germany from obtaining the
raw materials it needed from Mexico.”29 Germany boasted a population of around 6,000
nationals within Mexico, 30 and exploited this connection through the Auslands-Organization to
strengthen its budding propaganda machine, which itself aimed to inflame staunch antiAmerican sympathies. Most essential for German operations between 1934 and 1940, in both
swaying Mexico to the Axis side and in securing monopolies over Mexico’s natural resources,
was to remain out of sight and out of mind from. In this respect, Arthur Dietrich ingeniously
strategized forms of mobilization that rested on the foundation of German immigrants, but
ultimately stemmed from the passions of the Mexican population.31 This was most effectively put
to the pen by individuals like José Vasconcelos, José Pagés Llergo, Rubén Salazar Mallen, and
Rafael Zubaran Campany. The United States, through its own intelligence reorganization
efforts, noted via FBI observations in Mexico City that “German propaganda started to be
perceived as a threat to the United States and a real obstacle to closer relations with Mexico.”32
As described and corroborated in meticulous depth by Aaaron Navaro in his book Political
Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954, the U.S. – in a half-baked, yet still
potent attempt to block Nazi forces in Mexico – would intervene in the 1940 Mexican elections,
by “[backing] the opposition candidate Juan Andreu Almazán...[as] Dietrich’s activities33 were
becoming a nuisance to a Mexican government [allegedly] unable to cope simultaneously with
local problems and U.S. pressures.”34

29
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Unfortunately, the reaction by U.S. State Department officials had merit but, as National
Archives and Records Administration records indicate, the German presence not only affirmed
the growing covert threat within the U.S. consciousness, but also a reality that produced
tangible, albeit exacerbated results. “‘The Nazis have an organization in Mexico which is next to
perfect, in which all the Germans living in Mexico are enrolled, and whose tie is the ideology of
terrorism.’”35 This is perhaps exaggerated, but is nonetheless important as the effectiveness of
intelligence digestion into foreign and domestic policy does not necessarily correspond to the
total authenticity of the information itself, but the perception that it is true, as it equates to a
feeling or partiality of truth36 that eventually leads to ideological infection. In the meantime, the
relentlessness of German interests prevailed;37 their display of military might by invading Europe
left Mexican officials more open than ever to considering hardline alliances38 and trade
monopolies based on pre-existing historical conditions. Much like the United States, Germany’s
extreme pressures to achieve overtly perennial footholds ultimately left it at a disadvantage,
whilst the Mexican Government was left on the high ground with the agency to selectively
benefit – if viewed solely as business – from both Germany and the U.S., as Cárdneas would
reason, solving any economic insecurities.39 Essentially, the Cárdenas regime demonstrated its
deft skill at overt declarations in tandem with covert actions by “[dealing] with the Axis regime
much more than has ever been admitted, while all along claiming to favor Allies”40 for the most

35
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pragmatic reason, “[l]ess out of sympathy for Hitler than as a result of their antipathy towards
the United States.”41 However, as crucial as the U.S.–German diplomatic passive–aggressive
rivalry was important to Mexico’s counterbalancing act, which ultimately left Nazi Germany and
the United States in limbo, Mexico’s geopolitical maneuvering to squeeze the best deals from
the United States and Japan over topographical assets was the result of pure business acumen
and pressures.
Ultimately, Germany’s long-term failures stemmed from not focusing solely on attaining
control over Mexico’s natural resources, but instead swaying the natural consciousness of a
country towards declarations of Axis alignment through exploiting anti-American sympathies.
Their failures were also due to the expansion of U.S. intelligence services resources – and
perhaps to failures of the Auschlands-Organization, which correlated with the increasing
effectiveness of the FBI and MID – who interceded in attempts to take back control of
negotiations, much to the chagrin of the American agencies. The Mexican Government was
sending the U.S. a very clear message: they had no claims to establish military bases nor on
their expropriated resources. This became all the more clear when dealing with another major
Axis power, Japan, which in 1935 “[b]egan to be more interested in securing large quantities of
raw materials, particularly strategic minerals for its war industry.”42 This first stage of its success
was partly due to “The Treaty of Amity and Navigation signed by Mexico and Japan on October
8, 1924: this agreement awarded Japanese citizens privileges not enjoyed by other foreigners
[in Mexico], and it remained in force until 1933.”43 Despite the dissolution of the treaty in 1933,
the nine-year head start of this non-violent diplomacy set the Japanese Government leagues
ahead of the United States and Germany when Cárdenas expropriated the oil industry in 1938.

Ibid.,, 34: Paz further argues that “Cardenas postponed any action against German intelligence agents
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Japanese representatives like Kisso Tsuru understood the sensitive nature of expanding into
the oil venture, “see[ing] the long-term advantages of securing a strong foothold in the Mexican
oil industry…[and that] the oil question in Mexico was highly politicized and much caution
needed to be exercised...”44 when striking deals and bribes with Mexican politico-businessmen
behind closed doors. Instead of exploiting anti-American motivations, Japan used provisions
within Mexican law, as “[a]fter the expropriation, the participation of foreigners in the oil industry
was banned, and it could never have been openly acknowledged that Japan had a vested
interested in that industry.”45 This planning appears strong, certainly a precursor to standardized
Mexican politics, as fifteen to twenty years later in the PRI there remained a bottom line
understanding between Japanese companies like La Laguna, run by Tsuru, or the Pacific Oil
Company, run by Taiheiyo Kaisho, and the central government in Tokyo that these negotiations
remain covert as “neither Japanese private interests nor the Japanese Government wanted to
be openly associated with the deals.”46
Mexico’s bizarrely unique situation at this juncture in 1940 requires reflection. Lázaro
Cárdenas’s consolidation of the national party, the PRM, in addition to nationalization of the oil
industry in 1938, thrust Mexico into a wildfire of geopolitics to which it was perhaps unsuited.
Nonetheless, it performed correctly, which was a determining factor for its place within the postwar global dynamics. In order for Mexico to properly navigate the sea of international relations,
Mexico had to strengthen and reinforce its rather unkempt domestic politics. The one-party state
amalgamation project was incredibly ambitious, especially in proportion to Mexico’s land mass,
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the density of cities like Ciudad de Mexico, and the country’s ethnic diversity, including
immigrants from such countries as Japan and Germany. Relative order had to be maintained,
which could be reduced to a two-step process: decimating the power of the military and
exponentially increasing domestic, partisan police forces and intelligence services. “By 1947,”
writes Aaron Navarro in Chapter Four of Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern
Mexico, 1938-1954, “Mexico boasted an outwardly professional intelligence service modeled on
the organization and techniques of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).”47 A stable
political state emerging from the ashes of ten years of civil wars, or the fear of lapsing back into
this, drove the political elites to conditions of unadulterated paranoia. Venustiano Carranza
understood this best in 1918, by commanding “[i]nformation on his friends and enemies in order
to maintain political control [Departmento Confedencial].”48
During its lifespan, the iteration of Mexican Intelligence, the DFS, which was prevalent
during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, became the personal hand of “Presidential authority” – unlike its
corresponding branch based in the United States, the FBI.49 This is itself was troubling
considering the relationship between Mexico’s commander-in-chief and the CIA. Much like its
1918 ancestor, the DFS “afforded the political elite a valuable (and legal) tool for suppressing
dissent…”50 During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the role of covert programs was rising, and
more resources were given to the MID, FBI, and DFS. The agencies, like the secret police of
many authoritarian states, “were professionalized…[and] also became more politicized and
established lasting ties to the bureaucratic and political agenda of the PRI.”51 Most importantly,
as is discussed throughout the rest of Navarro’s book, the intelligence-gathering of the DFS
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allowed for political competition to be snuffed52 almost as quickly as it gained traction; a silent
hand that paved the way for a form of stability which was the basis “[o]f the PRI’s electoral
dominance over the decades after World War II.”53 Even if Mexico was suddenly propelled into
the geopolitical spotlight during World War II, Mexico had the backdoor luxury of major global
powers vying for its resources, in addition to limited fighting54 which allowed for covert action to
be concentrated almost solely towards the progression of the Mexican party-state, thus allowing
it to negotiate with the United States, Germany, and Japan on very familiar terms.
Ergo, when talks between Mexico and Japan on the germination of oil pipelines and
oversees wartime trade was discovered by the United States and an embargo was accordingly
enforced, it represented a key moment for the Mexican Government – regardless of whether it
recognized these events happening in the context of their historical linearity or not. In a pivotal
page towards the end of the chapter “Mexico and the Axis Threat” in Paz’s book, she explicitly
details two points of significance during this moment of realization. First, the power of the
American Embassy and Ambassador55 in handling foreign relations, and the commitment to
clandestine politics by the Mexican President56 – either because of his ignorance of autonomous
local politics57, which in itself is problematic, or because of his cunning58 as a the spearhead of
Mexico’s awakening power. Subliminally, the groundwork for Mexico’s post-war policy and
future is laid out. Mexican policy, more specifically that of “Cárdenas’s flirtation with Japan
during his last year in office was consistent with his attitude toward Germany. More than an
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ideological identification there was a need to create a counterbalance in relation to the United
States.”59 By acting in this tripartite manner during his sexennio, Cárdenas granted more
freedom of movement and leniency towards the non-military physicality of foreign powers, albeit
with ideological constraints, as best as could be implemented throughout Mexico. Acting in this
manner not only placed a heavier emphasis on the actions of external policy on Mexico’s
domestic situation, but in addition greenlit Mexico as a grab-bag for covert movement, including
the roles of intelligence agencies as sanctioned by their respective governments, and rebellious
“foco” groups fighting against those very powers. Mexican policy therefore created strengths
through seeming paradoxes.
For one, it confused the U.S. State Department into allegiances which acted as a type of
bargaining chip for Mexico, whilst simultaneously using forms of state-terror to keep its
population in check through the quintessential American ideal of fighting Communism; this
certainly kept the gateway of money flowing from the United States. One can only speculate that
American government officials saw between these cracks, turning away from the issue of oil and
overt hemispheric defense to using Mexico’s perceived advantage as a backdoor for the FBI
and CIA to gain a foothold in the hub of espionage, thus truly beginning a golden age of
surveillance and counter-espionage. Mexico had inadvertently been invaded by the United
States once again. This dynamic only complicates matters further, as arguments and counterarguments over the victims and victors of these clandestine policies becomes a catch-22,
ultimately affecting not only international relations but the consequences and fallout of Mexico’s
domestic Cold War historical legacy.
Reducing multiple major furtive dynamics spanning roughly more than 77 years60 can be
challenging, as one must attempt to piece together histories that were deliberately kept secret;
perceptions of truth can be perceived as fiction or are often too incomprehensible to classify.
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The global fallout from World War II provided Mexican and American services with this chance:
the fascist threat and related business opportunity slowly bled into the great Red menace of
Communism. Unlike Germany and Japan, the poster children for fascism in Mexico during the
1930s and 40s, global declarations for the demise of any communist terror had a biography of
spite, fear, and persecution. German and Japanese migrants dating back to the early 1920s
settled in Mexico with the relatively undiluted intentions of establishing new political–economic
alliances in the wake of a reborn Mexico, triumphing form the ashes of ten brutal years of civil
wars. During the dawn of World War II, Germany and Japan each endeavored respectively61 to
maximize resources from Mexico–German attempts to convert the country as a whole and
Japanese attempts to secure land for oil production and transportation.
Efforts to subvert fascist progression in Mexico by Mexican or American forces
appeared as a secondary facet to World War II: reactionary and superficial, designed only to
subvert major aggressions as they emerged, additionally coinciding with an alteration in U.S.
attitudes towards its southern brethren. Direct military confrontations based around moralism or
realism in Latin America would tarnish the U.S. Government's reputation, especially when its
legacy included the disasters of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The 1955 ratification of the
Warsaw Pact62 only solidified global commitment to omnipotent surveillance states, for which
the FBI’s tenure in monitoring Mexico City from around 193963 established a firm foothold for
American operations throughout Latin America, especially for the newly established Central
Intelligence Agency in 1947.
The intentions and actions of Japan and Germany for roughly a decade, coupled with
rising post-war fears, especially for the ambitious Mexican party-state, neatly converged to a
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dynamic of “[h]eavy U.S. involvement in training and supplying the Mexican services in order to
guarantee their reliability in protecting the common border.” There was a price to pay, however,
as increasing effectiveness of the DFS allowed the “FBI [ascendency] in Latin American
intelligence operations.”64 The delicate dynamics of this FBI ascendency, paving the way for CIA
domination in the late 1960s, also reinforced the authoritarian nature of the PRI such that “[t]he
repressive capabilities of the intelligence services combined with the political zeal of the PRI
leadership provided the party the means to dominate political life for decades.”65
One must not take lightly the impression left by individuals throughout the fortification of
state formation and behavior in international relations during the mid-20th century. In particular,
Lázaro Cárdenas, the grandfather of the nation, set the precedent for U.S.-Mexican relations
throughout the Cold War. By nationalizing oil in 1939 when it was crucial, barely twenty years
after the Mexican Revolution, he became the first Latin American head of state to enter the
post-World War II period of anti-colonial struggles, solidifying Mexico's position by claiming
neutrality through the Non-Alignment movement, thus promoting the idea that the third world
should be independent. It is difficult to imagine future sexennios leaving behind footprints as
impactful as Cárdenas’s; Cárdenas became the gold standard for Mexican presidencies, not
only in stature, but under the tutelage of Cárdenas.
As post-World War II recuperation morphed into the Cold War, Mexico began to unfurl its
political ideology as a haven for political refugees in an act of solidarity, simultaneously shifting
priorities from exporting its own revolution to hyper-nationalizing myths. The revolution did leave
a structure of government, however; a “Hegemonic Party”, an independent, corporate entity,
influenced by traces of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism in addendum to prioritization of
U.S. State Department interests which chronically influenced Mexico’s geopolitical alignment.
Reactionary, but never neglecting its profound sense of national dependence, Mexico’s
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domestic policy revolved around a set of institutions that defined the perception of the country
as a more developed and stable society than many of its neighbors, which accordingly
developed Mexico’s agency to please as many countries as it could through its tripartite
balancing act. There was no outright denial, instead there was an opting to wear out and thin
the competition through negotiation until they backed off. Pressures to uphold stature and the
spirit of the myths of the Mexican Revolution could alternatively enable the necessary
justifications for an invisible hand, such as the CIA, in the overwhelming pursuit to project
Mexico as intrinsically stable.
The CIA did not simply begin its illustrious career in 1946 as the despised powerhouse in
Latin America that overthrew or paid off democratically elected governments to uphold its
dedication to eradicate communism. “The Association for Responsible Dissent estimates that by
1987, 6 million people had died as a result of CIA covert operations. [In fact] Former State
Department official William Blum correctly calls this an ‘American Holocaust.’”66 The CIA
supported some of the deadliest, longest-lasting right wing authoritarian juntas in human history;
some of these countries, like Chile67, Guatemala68, and Argentina,69 remain as bloody hell holes;
others that emerged from the dark stains of the Cold War are still attempting to reclaim their
history and punish those responsible through the legal system. The CIA came from more simple
origins, from dreary offices in London, England, barely able to support the success of its
operations.
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In the age of Wikileaks and declassified National Security Archives documents, one
constant remains: the Central Intelligence Agency, which enthusiastically supported men like
Augusto Pinochet or Efraín Ríos Montt, ingeniously implementing failsafes to distance itself
enough from its crimes in order to remain unpunished for its flagrant human rights violations.
Even countries like Mexico, which have often been cited by historians like Peter H. Smith as the
exception to the “traditional Latin American narrative” did not remain untouched by American
intelligence, but were played. The face of Mexico’s one-party system masked the CIA agent,
Winston Scott, who injected a viral network of agents to create the most important information
collection and counterintelligence operations station in the world. This is, once again,
superficially bizarre if one accepts Mexico as a rising, independent geopolitical juggernaut,
exploiting the vulnerability of the world theatre during World War II in order to assert itself as a
paragon of Latin American influence.70
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Part I: LI-ving in Mexico, 1956
“Our Mexico station was the most elaborately equipped and effective in the counterintelligence
field of any we had in the world,’”71 John Whitten

Chapter One: Beginnings of the CIA Empire [1946-1954]

The decade between September 1945 and August 1956 appears overtly inconsequential
in the span of global history. The Korean War, spanning from 1950 to 1953 is certainly not
irrelevant, but as NATO Pact and Marshall Plan recipients solidified alliances in tandem with the
opposing Eastern European Warsaw Pact members, the theatre of new age warfare skirmishes
had been staged. The success of the Manhattan Project quickly thrust nations into the frenzies
of the atomic age, exponentially escalating domestic and international tensions towards the
precipice of M.A.D72(ness).73 Woven within and entombed beneath this Shakespearean drama,
a more sinister epoch of Western geopolitical strategy unfurled from “Ryder Street, [where] that
soldierly bond [was] forged working in [the] cold”74 Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
headquarters in London. Over informal dining experiences, two sets of men in the latter half of
two decades bookended the forging and demonstration of American counterintelligence
supremacy. First Kim Philby, one of the most infamous double agents in espionage history, and
Winston “Scottie” Scott75 kindled the fire in 1946, allowing the OSS to transition into the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), which eventually grew and rebranded itself as the Central
Intelligence Agency,76 and which, “for the next twenty-five years...grew into a worldwide empire
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of violence, propaganda, influence, and power.”77 Over a decade later, in August 1958, Scott
would dine with an unnamed informant in Los Pinos78 and “[f]rom that summertime breakfast [in
Mexico] would emerge the operation known as LITEMPO, a network of paid agents and
collaborators in and around the Mexican president’s office that proved to be one of Win’s
greatest professional accomplishments.”79
Empires do not simply run themselves, however, and this is especially true for a cloakand-dagger enterprise. Talented liars and ambitiously patriotic individuals, through covert
actions, attempt to enact their interpretations of national policy upon countries or organizations,
whilst keeping the extent of their actions redacted within one's own agency, other national
agencies or government branches, and secret from the public masses that their movements
supposedly protect. Any failure of duty could have untold consequences, including personal
betrayal – the most catastrophic. Winston Scott, Allen Dulles, and Philip Agee understood these
intricacies perfectly. 80 Saccadic masking, the pinnacle of successful espionage operations,
indicated a chameleon-like adeptness in carrying out orders in plain sight, a lesson that British
and American Intelligence did not learn soon enough in Eastern Europe.81
In order to thoroughly understand the CIA’s paramount position in Mexico City, one must
interweave the macro and micro developments of the institution and of its eventual station chief,
Winston Scott. As Scott rose through the ranks of the espionage world,82 it became clear that
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his entire career, highly influenced by his time in London and the effect of MI6’s Oxbridge club
world,83 would be defined by unwavering belief in the sanctity of personal loyalty.84 The CIA’s
first five years as an independent American institution yielded less than stellar results in the fight
against Communism, both on the global battlefront and in addition to its diplomatic relations with
MI6. When Kim Philby was eventually exposed as double agent in 1951after around seventeen
operational years,85 one can imagine the deeply profound sense of betrayal felt by Scott. He
knew Philby personally as a family friend and as professional colleague, having helped him to
move through the ranks of covert bureaucracy and as a representative of the freshly formed
CIA. Matters were not helped either for the Central Intelligence Agency or for Scott: “[a]s
inspector general, [he] had to deal with the realities of the agency, and they could be publicly
humiliating. In December 1952, the Soviets made the CIA spooks look especially silly.” 86 One
can only imagine the psychological stresses this places on a government agency or individual,
as treachery after deceit after deception stacks up exponentially, inducing crippling self-doubt in
national allies, close personal friends, and the ability for the self to be a patriot fulfilling his
duties. Although Scott’s predicament as a tool of the American government did not necessarily
improve in the short term, an almost clinical drive for absolute control and success can be
traced to this time. This psychology certainly applies towards the CIA as an institution operating
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within Latin America, but more importantly towards Winston Scott, representing the idealistic,
microcosmic synergy between the more conservative democracy of the late 1940s and 50s, and
his own personal ambitions. This did not however indicate a smooth, linear ascension towards
his promotion to field station chief in Mexico City running LI. It is in this manner that one can
view Scott as a microcosm of the autonomous CIA, protecting and propagating American values
in the global conquest of ideology (and territory). Thus, there was a shift of focus towards
Western Hemisphere containment, in an attempt to uphold the faces of the Monroe and Truman
Doctrines, against a perceived easier target, as the KGB was too relentless in the Eastern Bloc.
What were Scott’s core ambitions, the platform that was supercharged during the
espionage fiascos of the early 1950s? “Win felt strongly that it was imperative for the new
agency [the CIA] not just to collect information via espionage but to also mount secret
operations against communist forces everywhere.”87 Nonetheless, merely having committed
goals does not reflect the methodology and means of achieving such formidable objectives. It is
no coincidence that Scott concocted some of his most important career plans at luncheons with
Kim Philby, Allen Dulles, Jim Angleton, or high ranking Mexican statesmen, as “[h]e excelled at
that most benign of the espionage arts, the art of making friends with people with different
loyalties. His specialty was ‘liaison.’ [During World War II] He bonded with the British, knowing
how to elicit their cooperation and secrets, despite the fact that they were self-interested and
sometimes snobbish.”88 This is fundamentally important for Scott’s tenure as Mexico City’s
station chief between 1956 and 1968, as this allowed him personally to seamlessly navigate and
exploit the PRI’s politics of “friendships”. Before any of this could be established, however, the
CIA – which was the underdog within the global context of the Cold War – had, much like the
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Mexican state during the late 1930s and World War II, to uniquely assert itself as a serious
actor.
There was no better way to do this than with success, or more specifically, Operation
Success;89 a paradigm of the Truman Doctrine under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower,
taking place five years before Fidel Castro and Che Guevara ousted Fulgencio Batista on
January 1, 1959.90 The ability to install91 Colonel Castillo Armas would demonstrate the
commitment to which defense of U.S. interests became an outward expansion of actively
intervening in the affairs of countries in which the U.S. perceived a foothold for communist
influence, blinding State Department and intelligence members to the realities of the target
country in favor of radical anti-communist ideology.92 The unequivocal triumph of this program
was paramount for two crucial reasons. First, the failures on the Eastern European front crippled
the resolve of foreign operations to live up to nationalist rhetoric. Second, dispensing selfproclaimed American justice in their own backyard93 determined the future capacities of U.S.
intelligence programs in Latin America, thus setting the parameters and standards for future
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covert operations.94 The bloody coup95 of 1954 followed this model to the letter,96 which resulted
in a major moral boost for the State Department, but also simultaneously provided the set up to
the punchline of the joke which was Operation AMCIGAR. In the foreword to the 41 page CIA
briefing about SUCCESS, Chief Historian of the CIA, J. Kenneth McDonald, states that “Nick
Cullather's Study of PBSSUCCESS reveals both why CIA thought PBSUCCESS had been a
model operation, and why this model later failed so disastrously as a guide for an ambitious
attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs 1961.”97 In a cruel deliverance of bathos
that only hindsight could truly illuminate, “[t]he State Department’s review of Latin America in
late 1952 found it ‘improbable that the Communists will gain direct control over the policy of any
Latin American state, at least during the next several years.’ The Soviet Union had no presence
in Guatemala. Communist diplomats in neighboring Mexico rarely visited.”98
This still does not quite pinpoint the psychological principles that propelled such
polarizing outcomes in the 1954 and 1961 covert operations. If the Truman Doctrine served as
an umbrella that merely articulated a general consensus of the Western Cold War aesthetic, a
more contextual framework of American ideological stabilization must have been consolidated
to allegedly rid their backyard from communist pests. In Talons of the Eagle, Peter H. Smith
eloquently described a ten-step plan that allowed men like Colonel Castillo Armas or Fulgencio
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Batista to usurp or retain their footholds in Latin America on behalf of the United States.99 The
CIA, with the power and agency to pull the trigger on any of these plans, unreservedly shot first
asked questions later without regard for the consequences – which all but became the norm
throughout Latin America. From the execution of the Guatemala coup onwards, “[o]n the
clandestine side, the prevailing CIA view was different: any communist influence was a sign of
incipient Soviet control [in the context of the Cold War] no matter what Guatemalan democracy
decided.”100 Though not necessarily involving Winston Scott to the extent one would see a mere
few years later in Mexico City, it is vital to recognize the Mexican Government’s stance through
the ordeal. Their passive denial towards Secretary John Foster Dulles’s policy regarding the
Pan-American dedication to subverting international Communism101 through a vote of abstention
during the “Caracas Declaration of Solidarity; March 28, 1954”102 months before CIA operations
destabilized the country is certainly a testament towards Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and the PRI’s
ability to double down on Cold War geopolitics. The lack of both hardline rejection and any
commitment towards Dulles’s policy left Mexico in the good graces of both the Latin American
governments and the U.S. State Department. Ernesto “Che” Guevara certainly took advantage
of this opportunity, after witnessing the collapse of Jacobo Arbenz’s government, which, as
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Mark T. Hove contends in his article “The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean
Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala”;103 opened his eyes to Latin America’s
struggles. He then fled to Mexico City where he and Fidel Castro104 would exponentially
radicalize Cold War bipartisanship. Meanwhile, “Win celebrated over lunch with Jim Angleton. It
was a great day for the agency.”105
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Chapter Two: Foundations For a Covert Empire [1956-1958]

Whether or not the CIA knew of or seriously counteracted any of the Cuban guerrilla
activities before the Cuban Revolution is difficult to ascertain, especially in lieu of Scott’s
establishment in the Mexico Station. What is abundantly clear is the timeliness of Woodrow
Wilson’s sentiments about Latin America in 1917: “‘What America has to fear, if she has
anything to fear, are indirect, roundabout, flank movements upon her regnant position in the
western hemisphere.’”106 In the meantime, Operation Success fulfilled its function better than
many could have hoped,“prov[ing] that Americans could subvert, sabotage, and destroy their
perceived enemies and feel good about it.”107 However, as this narrative rests both on the CIA’s
exploits and Winston Scott’s personal accomplishments, the period between the Arbenz Coup in
1954 and the formal installation of the Mexico City Station in 1956 left Scott in an increasingly
frustrated position. His drive, motivation, and dedication towards the CIA and the United States
remained a constant linearity, in contrast to the realities of internal bureaucracies, which left
Scott stuck at a cul-de-sac in his career. In addition to feeling particularly jaded, he perceived
the system was devaluing his time and efforts, thus depriving him of the wave of upward
mobility that Jim Angleton and Bill Harvey were riding after the success of Guatemala.108 This
sting hit Scott particularly bitterly in light of an initially deceptive thrust into the upper echelons of
the agency. “As the winter of 1954 turned into the spring of 1955, Scott had secured a position
of trust in the commanding councils of the CIA, not as a policy maker but as a
troubleshooter.”109 The life of war ten years prior, of imminent destruction in the face of V-2
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rockets, had slowly corroded into monotonous paper pushing in which Scott “[n]ow...attended a
lot of meetings, many of them unrelated to the intelligence-gathering work he loved.”110
Desperation and resentment festered, all the more aggravated by the arrival of his newborn son,
Michael, and a thyroid condition.111
Interestingly, Scott’s initial deployment to Mexico stemmed not necessarily from a blind
sense of loyalty, but from a desire to escape to an “exotic” locale, Latin America, a place for a
gringo to craft his own story. For Scott, “[l]ife was going to be just fine, just as soon as he could
get the hell out of Washington. Dulles responded with a deserved prize. Scott would be the chief
of the CIA’s station in Mexico City.”112 Unfortunately, not much more explanation is given within
Jefferson Morley’s book, nor through other attainable primary or secondary sources, regarding
either Scott’s status as the new station chief, or an overall idea of the relationship between the
CIA and Mexico City. To extrapolate, insofar as information does exist, what this does indicate
is the convergence of covert and overt American outlook and policy towards Mexico. First, if one
accepts that there was no embassy built in Mexico City until 1960 – why was this? Did the U.S.
Government assign little to no strategic value to Mexico City until Winston Scott made it
important? Where did the CIA work in its stead? If the U.S. embassy on Paseo Reforma was
indeed operational when Scott began work in Mexico, the lack of concrete information for
something seemingly so simple is questionable. The CIA did, in fact, have an inconspicuous
presence in Mexico City five years earlier under E. Howard Hunt, but then dismissed his post to
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focus on Operation Success in 1953.113 More mysterious is the perplexing job of historically
placing America’s overt diplomatic representation, the embassy, in conjunction with Scott’s
arrival. Scott was placed in Mexico City in late 1956 or early 1957, where he not only worked out
of the embassy on Paseo Reforma, but “was officially part of the State Department too. For
public consumption, his job title was First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy.”114 Other limited115
sources place the initial construction of the embassy in 1960, and final completion in 1964.
Morley certainly helps matters not by omitting chronological infrastructure in Chapter Seven
“The American Proconsul”. Perhaps minutely important in the grand scheme of CIA enterprises
in Mexico City, the noticeable lack of information, a black box, perhaps attests to successful
saccadic masking in the covert world; the tip of an iceberg of deception in the digital age.
Assuming that Mexico City’s tantamount strategic location was ambiguous, a country
whose focus on inward domestic consolidation left it in a precarious balancing act, especially in
the wake of the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement.116 Thus, Scott inherited a personal and
institutional quandary: how to carve his legacy into the annals of the CIA whilst simultaneously
wading through Mexican politics to solidify allegiances and plant the seeds of American foreign
policy. Assuming Howard E. Hunt made little to no progress, Scott opted to hit the ground
running and “wasted no time in stepping up the scope and power of CIA operations.”117 Before
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acting as CIA station chief however, Scott had his personal work cut out for him; as a
newcomer, he suffered the major disadvantage of an being American who also shared the
name of a general heavily weighted by a hundred years of American imperialism.118 His
situation was additionally handicapped by neither speaking Spanish, nor having any powerful
connections.119 Additional pressures were compounded by the hierarchy in Washington that felt
that Guatemala’s triumph was an exception in a losing fight against Communism.120 Little would
the CIA understand at the close of 1956 that Scott’s appointment to a relatively unknown CIA
field station would be the Hail Mary the United States Government did not know it needed. The
CIA empire that Jim Angleton desired121 would spawn from Scott’s abilities to synthesize
business and pleasure through personal relations “with the leaders of the Mexican government
[with whom] he could be his natural self, an easygoing man, equally at home in male or female
company...He seduced Mexicans just as he had enchanted the British after the war: with a sly,
con dent, soft-spoken American charm.”122 Scott was simply reverting to techniques that 16th
century Spaniards knew all too well, the conquest of “the soul of mankind.”123
It is at this crossroads in which the Mexican PRI’s international system of double dealing
in conjunction with its domestic policy of consolidation and friendships collided with Scott’s own
ambitions and need for complete operational control. Unlike the Mexican-American business
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negotiations for oil and military bases during World War II, which immediately triggered a
defensive reaction by the Mexican Government – a new wave of American imperialism overtly
targeted towards them – Scott spoke the soft language of elites: individual wealth. The crucial
element boiled down to the perception of the actors involved in the interactions and where the
agency of the final outcomes lay. In the former, Mexico’s agency was in its power to stall and
deny the penetration and control of a United States Government institution. Scott’s strategy did
not represent imperialism, rather a mutual relationship between one individual and another as
“[h]e spoke to powerful Mexicans as a warm and reliable friend from the modern empire to the
north...Win Scott came with technology, cash, and friendship.”124 After all, he was the new kid
on the block, therefore how powerful could he be? As it turned out, Scott’s deadliness reflected
the seamless point wherein politics melded with informal dinner conversation; his arrival in
Mexico City during the latter half of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’s sexennio correlated to a juncture in
the Cold War chess game where the CIA had to transcend its function as a purely reactionary
force, and instead mold itself into the dominant global predator, where “[i]ts hidden
hand...remained unbound.”125
[At this occasion, it would be remiss not to mention a major disadvantage of this project.
Much of the evidence is biased towards the American perspective, in which the consequent task
of establishing a relatively hardline Mexican perspective is limited to English language sources.
Thus, for the moment, speculating on Mexican ambition and motivation, especially that of the
president, is filtered through a distinctly American viewfinder, although future inquiries most
certainly would include Spanish records from CISEN or other government sources.]
Superficially, the PRI under Adolfo Ruiz Cortines would appear to operate on a completely
different set of principles than that of the United States. Instead of propagating the image of a

124
125

Morley., 86
Ibid., 77

32

world-class police force, the PRI opted to focus on projecting “an aura of legitimacy”126 as it
upheld its post-revolutionary zeal. World War II certainly allowed Mexico some upward mobility
as a master negotiator between Japan, Germany, and the United States. That notwithstanding,
the fear of domestic instability always loomed large over the country, which left the government
to pivot its post-war strategy to exclusively emphasize image and branding, much like a
corporation. Evidently this paid off, as:
“Mexico stands out [still] as a paragon of political stability within contemporary Latin
America [during the Cold War]. There have been no successful military coups since the
nineteenth century and hardly any serious attempts since the Revolution of 1910-20.
Presidential successions have become genteel negotiations within the semi-official
party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which has dominated the electoral
arena for more than half a century. Civilians have gained control of the ruling
apparatus.”127
Imagine the scope of a project in which a government could not only deal with its domestic and
international problems adeptly, but simultaneously project a “tacit presumption of continuity, a
sense almost of timelessness.”128 Extraordinarily, this adds dimensions to the potency of
saccadic masking; in tandem with a long line of totalitarian governments,129 Mexico’s first victims
of government chicanery were its own citizens. The ingeniousness of this deception rests in the
catch-22 that serves as Mexico’s vehicle of affluence during the Cold War. By presenting a nonthreatening image of itself to its northern neighbor, Mexico “defied ideological labels. In its
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foreign policy, the PRI governments were anti-communist, but public opinion and the party line
demanded distance from the United States.”130
Underneath its stately exterior as a paragon of successful Latin American however, the
PRI was continually waging a repressive campaign to subordinate and assimilate its citizens in
an attempt to annihilate any modicum of dissidence131 or resistance to their rule132. This was the
Cold War after all, and any threat involving Communism would invite American intervention.
Guatemala was fresh on the CIA’s collective consciousness, so the best support Mexico could
hope for in 1956 was “[Scott’s] task, as defined in a yearly mission statement from
headquarters...combat[ing] communism. Mexicans shared a real interest in this agenda.”133
Ergo, Scott’s established personal charms with Mexican elites and his sense of duty to the CIA
– eerily like his early work with Kim Philby134 – would finally create the possibility for Scott to
establish an American counterintelligence empire. Scott’s early contact with Mexican aristocracy
not only served as deux ex machina for the United States Government, albeit four years later,
but for Ruiz-Cortines’s government “and the leaders of Mexico’s security agencies [that] spoke
the rhetoric of revolution, they increasingly feared the reality of the society they ruled — and
therein lay Scott’s opportunity. The Mexican power elite had to be anti-American in public
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discourse. In private, they wanted to protect their privileges.”135 One of Scott’s first major
political contacts was Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios,136 the eventual head of the DFS, “known for
his prominent beak, was smart and practical and would in time reign as the most powerful law
enforcement official in Mexico.”137 It is conceivably through this initial contact with Barrios
between 1956 and 1958 that Scott was able both to gauge the horizons for further action and
inform the U.S. Government of Mexico’s strategic importance as a hot zone in this Cold War. “In
Washington, Mexico was [finally] viewed as a battlefield. For the Soviet KGB, Mexico offered a
foothold in the Western Hemisphere.”138 Mexico’s insistence on remaining “neutral” during the
Cold War additionally amplified this idea; by allowing the Cuban and Soviet embassies to
remain open,139 they could claim solidarity and anti-imperialism while furtively concealing any
perspicacity of totalitarian or authoritarian tendencies.
This underlying psyche would certainly magnetize with Scott’s professional objectives in
Mexico “driven by Washington’s bipartisan imperative of turning back communism, [antithetical
to] the espionage of his Soviet counterparts was driven by their Marxist-Leninist understanding
of the historical fate of Mexico.”140 In tandem operated Scott’s need for direct success under his
personal supervision, wherein personal failures and betrayals could be minimized. It was during
his first few years as the representative of the CIA in Mexico that left Scott at an exigency in
which he needed astounding means to implement a phenomenal program, requiring years of
restructuring: namely to control Mexico by recruiting the highest bureaucrats in its political
system. A program so ambitious does not spawn overnight, and so Scott and his equal, Anne
Goodpasture, needed first to first convert chaos into order by restructuring the CIA field offices.
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The thoroughness in which Scott overhauled the Mexico Field Office141 reflected his
methodology and a tenacity that would fundamentally dictate the effectiveness of the LI/TEMPO
program beginning in the summer of 1958. If Scott and Goodpasture could shoulder the burden
of an onerous, yet relatively microcosmic project with such deftness, then perhaps merging the
vehicle of the PRI onto the highway of the American Cold War outlook was not so very farfetched. Additionally, Scott’s voraciousness in establishing solid foundations for covert
operations put him at odds with the American Ambassador, Robert C. Hill.142 Unfortunately,
territoriality, government bureaucracy, and formality would forever plague institutional
frameworks, creating roadblocks to Scott’s grandiose schemes – the embers of intra-agency
rivalry burned bright. It was particularly because of these strained relations during a formative
two year period that a fascinating power shift began to take place: the ambassadorial duties of
Hill became ceremonial, while Scott’s reformation of his new station led to a hostile takeover not
only of the embassy space, but of its duties, and at some point in 1957 it was clear to Hill that
he should “agree [to Scott’s work] only on the condition that the embassy would have no
responsibility for CIA actions. Soon Scott’s station was performing tasks that had not occurred
to Hill, like tracing the names of visa applicants and persons on the guest lists for embassy
functions.”143 It is currently unclear whether this was a truly mutual “agreement” or if Hill was
simply completing the bare minimum of his duties. Through this course of action however, Scott
had hit the ground at a full sprint and had – both literally, with Mexican elites, and figuratively,
with Hill – declared his zeal, thus firmly rooting himself at the beginning of a decade-long tenure.
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Impressively, prior to receiving the full support of the Mexican Government and branches
of the U.S. Government for his systematizing “LI”, much – if not all – of Scott and Goodpasture’s
groundwork was limited to whatever office work or lower level connections both of them could
muster. This was coupled with their political and strategic ingenuity, which shone through on two
distinct occasions. First, when Scott “noticed there was a row of four townhouses overlooking
the garden of the Soviet embassy on Avenida de la Revolucion, he arranged for a lawyer friend,
code-named LIMOUSINE, to buy them all.”144 Second, by using the cover of diplomatic parties
and loosened tongues of guests “who boasted, quietly and accurately, that [they] had access to
all outgoing communications of certain Soviet bloc countries….Once a month Win [Scott] would
meet the man in a parked car at a random location and escort him to a safe house.”145 Scott
was finally carving the tangible staircase of upward mobility that he so resented of his
colleagues back in Washington. In the few months leading to his clandestine meeting at Los
Pinos in August 1958, Scott’s architectural legwork resulted in noticeable reactions from his
colleagues and Mexican contacts. First, Scott completed his hostile takeover, effectively
assuming direct control of the American Embassy by physically relocating the CIA offices to the
top floors.146 Second, Scott’s two years of service lent credence to his position as the premier
American contact in Mexico in the view of Mexican agents. “As Win worked his contacts and
built his nets, he became the go-to guy. The Mexicans called the CIA station, ‘the real
embassy.’”147 As Scott’s reputation, foothold, and power grew in Mexico City, so did the
tumultuous situation 2,223 kilometers eastward. The small island nation of Cuba was starting to
make the U.S. Government sweat, despite “[its rejoice] in the overthrow of Arbenz in
Guatemala… The dictator Batista, once useful to the Americans, now seemed more obtuse than
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shrewd.”148 Although the August 1958 meeting at Los Pinos would officially inaugurate the LI
program, it would only display desired effects after January 1, 1959; its conditions for operations
would perfectly synchronize international policy with domestic functionality and vice versa. In
order to comprehend this dichotomous dance, one must first delve into and unpack the function
that would indeed make “‘[o]ur Mexico station...the most elaborately equipped and effective in
the counterintelligence field of any we had in the world.’”149
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Part II: Information and Informality Retains Power
Philip Agee: “Winston Scott, the Chief of Station in Mexico...has very close relations with both the
President, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, and Minister of Government, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.” 150

Chapter Three: The Tempo, Functions, and Rhythms of LI

1958 serves as a critical date, not necessarily within a congregation of M.A.D. Cold War
geopolitics, but for the intimacies and intricacies involved between two nations, represented by
two men, dining at Los Pinos “[f]rom [which] that summertime breakfast [in August 1958] would
emerge the operation known as LITEMPO, a network of paid agents and collaborators in and
around the Mexican president’s office that proved to be one of Win’s greatest professional
accomplishments.”151 Jefferson Morley diminishes the significance of what was not only
established, but formally legitimized in this meeting: informal relationships conducted within
formalized power structures, the saccadic mask. A new class of questions about the nature of
national sovereignty must be raised in its stead. In a post-World War II environment, dominated
by coalitions of countries, such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), intended to establish universal law, the set of
provisions categorizing self-determination and national sovereignty takes center stage. In the
very first provision, the 1996 UN ratification “[r]eiterates that, by virtue of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all
peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to determine their political status
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and that every State has the
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duty to respect that right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”152 If the perception of
Scott’s involvement at the highest levels of the Mexican state were purely in a friendly capacity,
offering only meager benefits, despite his stature in the CIA, any degree of domestic political
assertion on the PRI’s behalf could be exploited as incidental; a loophole. The real complexity
lies within the covertly explicit intentions of both the historically current Mexican president and
Winston Scott. Even if one cannot impose the 1996 UN charter on a Cold War framework, the
1949 Geneva Convention most certainly would apply. One of the thematic concerns of the entire
document lies in “the fear that the Protocol might affect State sovereignty, prevent governments
from effectively maintaining law and order within their borders.”153
But if Scott’s CIA in Mexico was able to conduct its own agenda whilst simultaneously
possessing a sovereign head of state to uphold a seamless and timeless table, this connection
might be viewed as morally unrighteous, but perhaps a legal grey area. This might be an
acceptable analysis if one perceived this relationship as unilaterally skewed towards American
domination. Mexico’s political agency as a master manipulator and negotiator is vital to this
relationship, thus creating the impression of mutual dependency. If the post-revolutionary
Mexican state imposed a multidimensional standard upon its constructed image that had to be
upheld: a stable modern democracy, neutrality, continuous spirit of revolution, and a presidential
stateliness that would always do Lazaro Cardenas justice. If first impressions appear
overwhelming and demanding – hardly enough for the business conglomerate of the PRI to
sustain – the underlying reasons for enthusiastic support from covert American forces,
especially when the tacit agreement stems from friendships. The subsequent intuition should at
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first swing towards contradiction and hypocrisy on behalf of the Mexican state. For an
independent institution so vehemently anti-imperialist, thus American, the CIA and FBI’s travails
in Mexico would theoretically cause international scandal. Though fewer sources exist or are
accessible regarding FBI operations than the already selective pool of CIA files, their presence
dating back to 1939, in conjunction with the establishment of the CIA in the early to mid-1950s,
reflects a profoundly different two-fold action on both American and Mexican governments. By
abandoning candidly direct military and state department parlance with each other, each opted
instead to subvert the public attention and discard the very game of politics, red tape, and law to
achieve results. In this vein, the contradiction of the PRI’s covert and overt policy serves the
purpose not of fulfilling revolutionary rhetoric, discarded during the Manuel Ávila Camacho and
Miguel Alemán sexennios, electing instead to exploit any means at their disposal. Only then
could the PRI manage persistently to retain power by assimilating or crushing any modicum of
subversion in the domestic sphere, additionally maintaining an air of harmless strength in the
international arena.
These assertions would mean little without contextualizing their place in the historical
timeline, which itself would yield little unless one isolated and deconstructed the fundamental
functions and depths encompassed by LI. At its most elementary, the moniker LI was given to
any operations or operatives within Mexico.154 Any interrelated programs or agents were
assigned a number: LITEMPO-1, LITEMPO-2, LITEMPO-4, LITEMPO-8 for high-level
government agents155 or LIEMPTY and its offshoots in LIEMPTY-1, LIEMPTY-2, LIEMPTY-6,
LIEMPTY-9, LIEMPTY-14, LIEMPTY-19. A distinct mark of Scott’s generally ambitious
character was his trickle-down approach. Both he and Anne Goodpasture conducted low-level
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recruiting during their first two years in Mexico City, but the LI program was initiated from the
highest level of government as an “orchestration of a political friendship and national
alliance”;156 as such the first assigned agent in his program was President Adolfo Lopez Mateos,
successor to Miguel Aleman, known as LITENSOR. Much as Mexico held “elections” every six
years, a facade for a system known as “El Dedo”, in which the outgoing president would pick a
close PRI cabinet member for the Presidential title, so operated their friendliness with the CIA.
Both Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in 1964 and Luis Echeverria Alvarez in 1970 respectively became
known as LITEMPO-2 and LITEMPO-8. As Agee explicitly corroborates, “[o]perations are
heavily weighted towards liaison (which rests on the unusually close relationship between
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, the president of Mexico and Winston Scott, the Chief of the Station) and
operational support (surveillance, observation posts, travel control, postal intercepts, telephone
tapping).”157
Operational support implies further penetration and corroboration with the Mexican
Government. LITEMPO did not simply refer to the Mexican president; it included but was not
limited to other cabinet members and Mexico’s version of the FBI and CIA, the “Defensa
Federal de Seguridad (DFS), the police force of the president...”158 The firsthand ties with the
DFS is absolutely paramount within Mexican operations; direct contact with policy makers is
certainly important, but the ability for Scott to relay orders directly to both the Mexican president,
and head of security services would be the catalyst for their covert successes for ten years.
Thus, Captain (then Lieutenant) Fernando Gutierrez Barrios of the DFS, one of Scott’s earliest
political contacts and friends, also became an annexation of the program, as LITEMPO-4. This
structure furthermore allowed Diaz Ordaz159 assurances of consistently ascertaining subversive
threats and the means by which to extinguish them. As Ferguson Dempster, MI6 station chief in
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Mexico, and Philip Agee both comment: “[they] especially appreciated the daily report on
enemies of the nation’ that Win delivered to Díaz Ordaz. Agee said the ‘daily intelligence
summary’ included sections on activities of Mexican revolutionary organizations that helped the
Mexican security forces ‘in planning for raids, arrests, and other repressive actions.’”160
Retention, incentivization, and continuity of these high-level government systems was
undeniably a concern for both Scott and the CIA hierarchy in Washington. Even if Allen Dulles
had faith in Scott’s assessment of Mexico’s strategic value, the fear of inconsistent results could
be the biggest setback. A two-pronged approach was thus developed to keep each side eager.
First, Scott and Diaz Ordaz were busy running Mexico in tandem, so routine representatives
had to be able to continually keep avenues of information open. Thus, Diaz Ordaz elected his
nephew, Emilio Bolano, a car dealer and LITEMPO-1,161 and Scott “[c]hose one of his best
friends, a reliable FBI man in the embassy legal staff named George Munro, to handle the
details of their secret relationship.”162
Second, the political advantage of LITEMPO could act as enough of a stimulus for short
term efficacy, but, as seems to be the case with many elite castes, stockpiling personal wealth
is a key motivation for cooperation; monetary gain and materialistic bribes were the lingua
franca. Though the CIA had reservations about the value of work in ratio to amount paid, clearly
those concerns were abandoned, as demonstrated by the exponential increase of LITEMPO
expenditure from the end of Lopez-Mateo’s sexennio through the first few years of Diaz-Ordaz’s
sexennio, beginning at “$55,353 [to support] four employees, a five man surveillance team,
‘walking around’ money for Munro, and stipends for agents”163 increasing to “fifty employees and
a reputed annual budget of $50 million, [which] was described as ‘classic’ by the agency’s
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inspectors.”164 It was precisely in these negotiations that PRI officials outdid themselves; they
successfully exploited the economic supremacy of a U.S. agency like the CIA, ensuring that CIA
expenses included direct payment for their informants. Lopez Mateos, for example, through his
personal relationship with Scott, wrung a steady payment of $400 from him for his official
services.165 In addition, Scott’s arrangements, through Munro, necessitated the appeasement of
Lopez-Mateo and Diaz-Ordaz’s private lives. “ [He] bought a car for a girlfriend of Díaz Ordaz’s.
When Lopez Mateos heard, he insisted that [Scott] buy a car for his girlfriend, too.”166 Through
this duality, “[Scott] recruited agents for the LITEMPO program by showing that there were
practical advantages for Mexicans who privately cooperated with the Americans.”167 Scott and
Munro inadvertently formulated a new Mexican-American elite, a covert club similar to MI6
during the Cambridge Five scandals. This circle of mutual dependency allowed for the
simultaneous catalysts of “[t]he Mexican apparatus of repression and LITEMPO [to grow]
together. [Thus] Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, an up-and-coming power in DFS, became
LITEMPO-4. An ambitious aide to Díaz Ordaz named Luis Echeverria was LITEMPO-8. ”168
For these relationships to remain and sustain functionality implies clockwork precision in
the Mexican Field Station. Scott and Goodpasture’s reorganization in 1956 clearly set the
precedent for its operations well into the 1970s, as noted by Agee:
“The Mexico Station, in spite of its wide-ranging operational activities and numerous
personnel, is well known for its excellent administration. Two administrative officers and
a secretary handle finances and property, but Win Scott, the Chief of the Station, is
exceptional in his attention to administrative details as well as to leaving to advise the
receptionist where he is going and when he will be back. Morning tardiness is not
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tolerated, cables and dispatches are answered promptly, and project renewals and
operational progress reports are expected to be submitted on time. Considered
altogether, the Mexico City station is a tight operation – it has to be with fifty employees
and a budget of 5.5 million dollars.”169
Consolidation and efficiency must have been prevalent throughout the station. It is especially
noteworthy to contrast office funding. If the total CIA expenditure of $50 million is an accurate
estimation of funding, then the heavily skewed budget expenditure reflects Scott’s priorities in
running the embassy offices. If one additionally believes Agee’s estimation, the CIA field office
truly ran a tight ship, using only 11% of the eventual $50 million, opting instead to focus the
remaining 89%, or $44.5 million, on their elaborate payouts, stakeouts, surveillance, and
counterintelligence. The value placed by Scott on total secrecy could be one explanation for this
discrepancy, in accordance with his own faith in his ability to oversee and control a foreign office
and agents. But this incredible distortion would more accurately reflect the very fears Scott had
seen realized in the early 1950s: Kim Philby’s betrayal and the failed CIA and MI6 operations in
Eastern Europe. The overwhelming financial support dispersed in field operations would
guarantee that the CIA’s hold on Mexico would be omniscient and omnipresent. Every important
government figure was paid handsomely, every street corner of interest was watched by
operatives, and communist embassies were infiltrated and bugged. After all, “[a]t lunch, [Scott
had to be able to] offer his Mexican friends a cornucopia of intelligence on communists and
other enemies. How could the Mexicans not be impressed with the soft-spoken First Secretary
of the U.S. embassy?”170 Scott’s exemplary operations budget additionally indicated his
crushing determination to limit extraneous variables to achieve successful results; a priority in
infiltrating and strengthening his low-level contacts would only reinforce the upper echelons of
his government contacts and dictate steady channels of information. Most importantly, Scott’s
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steadfast and meticulous infrastructure spoke to his own personal pride in his work. Scott’s early
establishment in Mexico necessitated a radical professional upheaval, proving his merits as a
foreign officer. Yet Scott’s deep-seated symbioses not only retained their clockwork proficiency,
but in fact proliferated before the success of the Cuban Revolution. The levels of rigorousness
and viscosity demonstrate a keen demeanor and personal pride in one’s own work akin to an
artist crafting his or her pièce de résistance. “The records section is the largest and most
efficient of any station in the hemisphere and is said to be Scott’s pride. It contains detailed
personality files on thousands of Mexicans and foreigners resident in Mexico, in addition to
intelligence subject files, project files and index files. The records section is administered by a
qualified records officer with two full-time assistants and four working wives.”171
On the streets of Mexico City, this meticulousness is best exemplified by Project
LIPSTICK, renamed LIEMPTY, and its subsystems. Considering the enormity of operations in
Mexico City, one can partition operations into four categories: bureaucratic informants,
undercover informants, surveillance locations, and programs. LIEMPTY fit into the third
category, as did LIMUST,172 enacted during Scott’s first year, “[w]hen he noticed there was a
row of four townhouses overlooking the garden of the Soviet embassy on the Avenida de la
Revolucion, he arranged for a lawyer friend, code-named LIMOUSINE, to buy them all. He had
a plan.”173 These townhouses would be the first step in keeping track of the subversive sharks in
open waters. Two significant examples included LIERODE/LIONIN, a photographic surveillance
station overlooking the Cuban Embassy;174 and a three-part installation that completed
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coverage of the Soviet embassy, comprising LILYRIC,175 a third story apartment; LICALLA,176
“another observation post in the back of the closest of five houses bordering the Embassy
property”;177 and LIMITED,178 located directly across from the embassy entrance. Although the
Soviet and Cuban embassies became the immediate focus of PRI-CIA operations in the
historical timeline, close watch was also kept over Soviet allies, indicated by LIHABIT, the base
of operations, which allowed a joint reconnaissance venture of the Czechoslovakian
embassy.179
LITEMPO and LINTESOR, touched upon earlier, exclusively inhabited the bureaucratic
informant category, while exceptional ground operations served as eyes and ears on the
streets. Even though counterintelligence technology was evolving during the Cold War,
available equipment in the late 1950s and 60s was either modern and unreliable, or outdated
and analog, relying on teams of individuals to operate. Therefore the most contemporary
information and data was collected from ground operatives. Seven notable examples, ultimately
reporting to the Mexico Field Office, are revealed in two preeminent declassified sources: the
Mary Ferrell Foundation and Philip Agee’s CIA Diary; Agee himself describing “[m]y assignment
in headquarters...to the Mexico branch as officer in charge of support for operations against the
Soviets in Mexico City.”180 First, LIMOTOR181 recruited students at several Mexican universities
to keep tabs on the Soviet embassy and the Soviet intelligence officers182;

175

Cryptonym: LILYRIC. Accessed April 23, 2018.
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LILYRIC.
176
Cryptonym: LICALLA. Accessed April 23, 2018
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LICALLA
177
Agee., 543
178
Cryptonym: LIMITED. Accessed April 23, 2018
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LIMITED
179
Cryptonym: LIHABIT. Accessed April 23, 2018
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LIHABIT
180
Agee., 509
181
"Operational/LIMOTOR/Plans: Further Life of LIMOTOR Project." National Security Archives.
182
https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LIMOTOR

47

LIRICE/LIJERESEY183 was attributed to on-foot CIA surveillance teams “whose true names are
unknown”; LIENTRAP was a CIA photographic surveillance truck;184 LIEVICT more directly used
a network of radical Mexican anti-communist Catholics ;185 LICOWL referred to the “owner of [a]
small grocery store near [the] Soviet Embassy...where the Soviets buy foods and ends including
their soft drinks”;186 LICOZY 1 through 5 was a particularly crucial program which embedded
double agents “against the KGB”;187 LIOVAL was the moniker given to a recruited English
teacher in order to collect information from “Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and known senior
KGB officer”;188 LIFIRE dealt with the “Mexico City station travel control and general
investigations team.”189 First, it is no wonder that Winston Scott was obsessive about order in
the home office in contrast to the plethora of pieces moving about on the Mexican chess board.
One must certainly commend Anne Goodpasture and George Munro’s tremendous assistance
in both the day-to-day operations of the field station and in retaining communiques with
LITEMPO officials at Los Pinos. Secondly, the $44.5 million annual expenditure does not
appear, superficially, to be as outlandish for operatives, especially considering the revolving
constituents involved in the PRI-CIA operations. These programs became paramount to DiazOrdaz who “knew how to use the information generated by Win’s surveillance operations to
protect the power of the ruling elite.”190
The intelligence and counter-surveillance programs that were so endemic in Mexico City
involved incredibly intricate support systems: data collection ranging from audio-surveillance,
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wiretapping and mail intercepts, to establishing non-official CIA covers and covert financial
channels. Applying the same two declassified sources, nine programs emerge as the most
substantial during Scott’s tenure: LIDENY, LIENVOY, LISAMPAN, LIROMANCE, LIFEAT,
LIMUD, LIBIGHT, LILINK, LILISP. The first five programs exclusively dealt with audiosurveillance. As Agee alludes to in his diary, “[j]oint operations with Mexican security services
include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action.”191 LIDENY was a broader
wiretapping project, a “unilateral telephone-tapping operation”192 begun by “installing new wallboxes for the embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters will have been cast by
the TSD.”193 LIENVOY was a more politically precise surveillance collection in which “Soviet
telephones [were] constantly monitored...targeting Cuban and Soviet embassies and run in
conjunction with the Mexican DFS.”194 This was only the first foray into invasive surveillance
however, as LISAMPAN initiated physical “bugging operations[s] against the Cuban [and Soviet]
embassy”195 directly planting microphone transmitters, LICOOL,196 into furniture pieces,
LIROMANCE.197 If one adheres to Article 41 of the Geneva Convention, as Ashley Deeks
argues in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks, “[o]ne possible interpretation of this provision
is that states’ parties have agreed that their diplomats will not spy in the receiving state, as that
would violate the receiving state’s domestic laws.”198 But the case becomes exponentially more
murky when a domestic government like PRI simultaneously endorses and cooperates in
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retrospective illegal ventures.199 As confirmed by authors like Jefferson Morley, Philip Agee, and
John Dinges,200 “In practice, sending states commonly use diplomatic missions as bases from
which to spy on receiving states, a fact that is known to the receiving states.”201
How can one place the U.S-Mexico situation, in which the receiving state ardently
claimed solidarity with its leftist brothers against the U.S., when the reality was more dubious
and self-serving? Even if formal structures spawned from and were viewed as informal personal
relationships, their operations, in UN charters, should have adhered to some conception of the
conventions, “[h]owever, the practice by states both before and after the treaties’ adoption
(which reflects widespread espionage)... all strongly suggest that states traditionally have not
viewed existing treaties (or CIL) as regulating...surveillance in a meaningful way.”202 Thus, PRICIA relationships, predominantly interested in self-satisfaction through blatant international
violations, would continue to enforce a policy of containment of communist subversion in the
international arena, but also through dominance in the domestic sphere. As a testament to the
strength of the mutual relationship between Scott, Lopez-Mateos, and Diaz-Ordaz, he “also
arranged for taps on the phone lines used by domestic political rivals of Lopez Mateos and Díaz
Ordaz such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a leftist labor leader, and [even] former president
Lazaro Cardenas, who thought Castro’s example offered a way to renovate Mexico’s
revolution.”203 A subsequent project of massive data ingestion, called LIMUD and LIBIGHT,
involved the waylay of mail. Whereas the former was broader in scope, the latter more
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specifically dealt with transferring the “[m]ail opening operation in Mexico City, with Soviet
and/or Cuban targets.” 204
Two other contextual programs are central to understanding ground-level support
networks that reinforced CIA operatives and operations in Mexico City. LIENVOY, LIMUD and
their associated operations required mediums to decode and translate a plethora of information;
specialists of the highest caliber who could work with a hurricane of intercepts, then disseminate
the most vital news. Thus LILINK “was set up for three operations officers undercover as import
representatives. The Office of Communications designed a special cryptographic machine that
looks like an ordinary teletype and that transmits and receives encoded messages via a line-ofsight infrared beam.”205 Even more radical and fundamental to rooting out subversives was
LILISP, a “funding mechanism for covert action projects in Mexico”206 including the cultivation of
clerical propaganda, the mouth of the west. “LILISP paid 95 percent of the costs of a Catholic
Church periodical whose articles included features on ‘Christianity vs. Communism, the true
face of communism, dialogues between a campesino and a more politically sophisticated friend
on land reform and education, the menace of Castroism as it affects the Mexican countryside,
[and] what the Sino-Soviet conflict means to the average Mexican.’”207 To say that the CIA was
pervasive in Mexico could not be more of an understatement. Through these programs and
information systems helmed by Winston Scott, the CIA instigated relationships which intertwined
two government systems in a closed loop of mutual dependency and held onto the melting pot
of Mexican society with an iron fist. But two factors of the PRI-CIA relationship must be made
explicit. First “[t]o say that Win had the ruling class of Mexico in his pocket was little
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exaggeration. He was America’s proconsul.”208 But more importantly, and despite Scott’s
enormous importance towards the sustenance of the PRI, he was not the most powerful man in
Mexico. “By the mid-1960s, Win was effectively the second most powerful man in Mexico,
outranked only by Díaz Ordaz.”209
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Chapter Four: Close, but no AMCIGAR...and its Subsequent Reactions [1959-1964]

If there is one major takeaway from deconstructing some of the most pertinent functions
of the LI program, it should be the attempts of pervasive hierarchical coverage of Mexico City.
On paper, these systems and subsystems would appear airtight, which is precisely why their
successes, and more importantly their failures, within the Cold War historical framework
become paramount. More specifically, how did the personal, informal relationships of LI/TEMPO
affect its application in reaction to Cold War foreign policy functions? When the success of the
Cuban Revolution set the world aflame on January 1, 1959, State Department fears of
communist control in Latin America, which initially pressed the U.S. to overthrow Arbenz in
Guatemala, would finally be realized. Woodrow Wilson’s fears from 42 years earlier would be
realized. The PRI’s terror of systemic unraveling would only intensify as Mexico’s modern hero,
Lazaro Cardenas, would openly support “the [triumph of how the] once inconsequential Fidel
Castro had trounced the military organized crime alliance that controlled the government in
Havana.”210 Even more alarming was “Fidel Castro’s brief stay in Mexico...Shortly before Win
arrived in August 1956, the DFS [under Captain Gutierrez Barrios] had arrested Castro and
twenty-three companeros at a farm outside of Mexico City…[but] decided to let him go.”211 In
1959, however, the Cuban Revolution radically forced anti-communist CIA operations into
higher gear, additionally necessitating a reevaluation from the U.S. embassy of Mexico’s
vehement claims of political stability and alignments of interests.212 Although Cardenas was a
national hero, mythical even, he was still human, and something would have to be done if his
socialist rhetoric interfered with PRI-CIA operations. Perhaps “panic” is ill-suited to describe
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U.S. foreign policy, and is more apt to describe Mexico’s insecurities regarding the potential
shattering of its glass PRI house; regardless, the tiny island nation of “Cuba suddenly was a
huge political problem for the United States in Mexico. Castro’s victory inspired admiration on
the streets of Mexico and unsettled [Scott’s] friends at the top of the government.”213
An increase in Mexican domestic control and surveillance would not be a sufficiently
severe reaction to this matter. If the CIA wanted to protect U.S. borders by subsequently
retaining its foothold in Mexico, tit had to demolish the threat at its source.214 If Che and Fidel
could stage a guerilla movement from Mexico, why could not Scott? The expectation was
evidently a duplication of Operation Success; the reality was the greatest blunder of
professional career. “The great AMCIGAR [later known as Operation Zapata] fiasco of 1960
demonstrated that, even after four years as station chief, Win still had a few things to learn
about the ways of Mexico.”215 By 1960, LITEMPO was still in its infancy, and still required time
to mature before being incorporated effectively into major international operations. The failure of
the U.S.-backed Fulgencio Batista regime to defeat the Cuban revolutionaries sent shock waves
around the Western Hemisphere, with the realization that any marginalized and disenfranchised
group could strike a crippling blow against a major geopolitical power. Adding insult to injury for
the U.S. Government, Castro’s struggle resonated with a younger demographic both in Mexico
and in the United States, for example “[w]hen the Cuban communist spoke at Columbia,
Harvard, and Princeton, young Americans applauded.”216
Between 1959 and 1960, The State Department had to quickly shift paradigms from
preventative containment to contemporaneously combating the revolutionary wildfire through
any means – even armed invasion, and even if the establishment of LI was not necessarily
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ready. They had to act, as “[b]y March 1960, [CIA Director] Allen Dulles had seen enough. He
went to the White House with a plan to overthrow Castro.”217 The State Department simply had
to transplant the same formula that had deterred Guatemala from becoming, in their eyes, a
Soviet satellite state, into Cuba’s new revolutionary directorate. However, cracks formed within
the very infrastructure of their anti-Castro blueprint. The CIA drove the undercurrent of most
American foreign policy, based on a false assumption that an exception was the rule:
“Throughout the history of political thought, the idea of a state of exception has fascinated and
repelled political theorists who have seen in the idea both the only way to defend a state in peril
and the clear road to dictatorship.”218 Since Operation Success exceeded expectations, the
thinking indicated a one-to-one linear transformation in Cuba. Innate overconfidence plagued
the American psyche, however, and they blatantly ignored the historical backbone of failures
from the late 1940s into the 1950s. Even disregarding the CIA’s own checkered history, the
variables that would transform Cuba into an exponential challenge were severely
underestimated. “The scale would be much larger, and Cuba, unlike Guatemala, was
surrounded by water, not undeveloped countryside where Americans could operate freely...Few
doubted the formula would work.”219 It was to be a multilayered approach, spanning six
months,220 formed on the basis that covert propaganda would weaken Castro’s government
enough for an uncompromising ground assault.221 Thus, the CIA reached out to the one group
who despised the new revolutionary government more than the Americans – Cuban exiles living
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in Miami, Florida – encouraging them to reclaim the island through a counter-revolutionary
movement called AMCIGAR.222
AMCIGAR, as a microcosm of Zapata’s complete meltdown, rested on the combined,
intertwined overestimation of abilities on the macro and micro planes of CIA operation.
Principally, AMCIGAR,223 though never directly mentioned by its moniker in the official CIA
history, calls attention to the darkly theatrical attitude of the CIA bureaucracy. The CIA rhetoric,
specifically relating to financing of the new Cuban Government, in which “[t]he distribution of
costs between fiscal years [1960 and 1961] could, of course, be greatly altered by policy
decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations,”224
implies a narrow minded approach where the margin for error is solely contingent on the
operation succeeding; no back up plan exists in the face of failure. Additionally, notwithstanding
the cockiness of success, the entire anti-Castro operation began under the Dwight D.
Eisenhower administration, and when his term ended and John F. Kennedy’s began on January
20, 1961, Kennedy had to commit to the operation and its momentum months before its
implementation, on April 17, despite being distant from its inception. The CIA understood this,
vehemently considering the “state of U.S.-Mexican relations at the time President Kennedy took
office. The CIA, not the State Department, spoke for the U.S. Government.”225 From their first
encounters in early 1961, there commenced a strenuous relationship between the CIA and
Kennedy that served as an undertone throughout his short term226 in office.
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On the Mexican front, the institution of the CIA, assumedly understanding Scott’s four
years of work, misunderstood the tenacity of his friendships, and Scott clearly overestimated the
type of power he actually wielded as an agent of the CIA in Mexico City “secur[ing] the Mexican
rear guard.”227 Cracks in the blueprint became visible when the CIA was denied its staging
ground for AMCIGAR228 in San José, Costa Rica by the Costa Rican Government. Due to
Scott’s installation in Mexico City, it theoretically served as good a place as any to move
AMCIGAR, but “[o]rdering the relocation of the AMCIGARs to Mexico City in the summer of
1960 embodied the Americans’ arrogance.”229 The fact that they were of Cuban descent did not
inherently bother Mexican officials – rather it was the condescending American approach, the
“cultural chauvinism and ideological arrogance... Few of the operatives working to violently
overthrow Castro’s new government knew much about the country or the people they sought to
liberate.”230 It was in this vain, this unsophisticated insight into the intricacies of regional
variance in the Latin American sphere, that allowed the CIA to assume that AMCIGAR
individuals could seamlessly blend into and move unhampered within Mexican society solely
because they spoke Spanish. More importantly, Scott overextended the boundaries of his
friendship and mutual alliance with Lopez-Mateos and Diaz-Ordaz, by making calls over their
heads. Scott had “carelessly assumed that his budding friendships with Lopez Mateos and Díaz
Ordaz guaranteed that the agency’s favorite Cuban counter revolutionaries could come and go
through Mexican territory as they pleased.”231 The only agreement Scott had struck with the
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Mexican Government was for purely domestic reasons;232 this demonstration was perhaps
viewed by the PRI as an attempt by Scott to consolidate more power on behalf of the United
States. The first attempt cut the Mexican presidential office out of the equation and undid the
previous fifteen years of delicate consolidation and double dealing. Matters were not helped by
a startling lack of understanding of Mexican history, including a very loud and crass presence
within the city itself.233
AMCIGAR preparations continued to spiral out of control. AMCIGAR operatives were
exceedingly loud and unruly, persistently violating the local laws of their Mexican hosts. The CIA
was as much directly at fault as the Cuban exiles in their unwillingness to adapt to the new
Cuban parameters. Unlike Guatemala, the CIA thought little of learning about the island itself:
“[b]y comparison, [Scott and his] colleagues knew little of Cuba.”234 What they did know was
outdated by at least twenty years, when “Cuba [had] beckoned as a white man’s sexual
playground.” Lopez-Mateos and the PRI were also in a bind. They had equally to preserve an
immaculate standing in terms of financial and logistical support from the United States, and their
ideological, revolutionary brothers from Cuba. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution
and with AMCIGAR operatives treating Mexico City as the wild west, the PRI had to make a
concerted effort to regain control over an international situation from which they felt they were
slowly being excluded. For the PRI, one of the worst offences was Scott’s assumption that his
operatives could maneuver without respect for the Mexican institution, despite making an
explicit agreement that “Díaz Ordaz’s people at Gobernacion would approve the Cubans
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‘provided [there is] no evidence of Cuban-[CIA] connection and Cubans lived within Mexican
laws.’”235 One major step the PRI took to limit AMCIGAR exposure was to clamp down on
international travel, which could readily expose Mexico’s covert alignment with the U.S. and
their intricate infrastructure to root out communists. “Overnight, the agency’s Cuban allies found
themselves barred from boarding commercial airline flights to Mexico.”236
Irreparable damage had been done, however. Cuban officials, in attempts to establish
solid international relations, were already on the defensive edge. Furthermore, the CIA
completely miscalculated the direct effects the past would have on the present, especially in
relation to Operation Success. Before staging his revolution from Mexico City, Che Guevara
became radicalized when he saw the havoc reaped upon Guatemala. “Guevara, who had lived
in Guatemala in 1954, had seen firsthand the psychological warfare campaign behind Operation
Success and he had learned. He and Castro knew what to expect from the CIA, and they set
out systematically to deny the North Americans the ability to repeat it. Washington constantly
underestimated the ability of Cubans to see through the CIA’s machinations.”237 In the
introduction to the official history, Jack B. Pfeiffer claims that “[i]n the most simplistic of terms,
the US Government’s anti-Castro program which climaxed at the Bay of Pigs might have
succeeded only if...plans as evolved by CIA had been retained intact.”238
Taking into consideration both the tremendous force of revolutionary Cuban zeal, and
Che’s firsthand experience of SUCCESS, the AMCIGAR operatives certainly made enough
noise in Mexico City for anybody with a modicum of curiosity and counterintelligence capabilities
to detect.239 It appeared as if the Cuban exiles transplanted into Mexico were more trouble than
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they were worth after all. “Within weeks of their arrival the Cubans were proving a daily disaster.
[Scott] wanted the AMCIGARs gone, and soon they were.”240 Apparently Lopez-Mateos and his
administration agreed, judging how their international alliances were on the brink of
destruction241. Scott, ever the master of bureaucratic friendships, stabilized the PRI-CIA
relationships, and avoided an overt international scandal by pivoting the focus of international
efforts into the domestic sphere, where the PRI would unequivocally handle covert support.
Scott ingeniously “let the Mexicans solve their political problems and get rid of the Cuban
interlopers without having to refuse a direct U.S. request…[What was perceived as a]
concession to Mexican courtliness yielded the first real intelligence accomplishment of the
LITEMPO program.”242 While Scott rectified the CIA’s standing with Mexico, he also assisted in
retaining the mask that “[t]he Mexicans had protected their pride and sovereignty.”243 Instead,
Scott figured, the CIA could maximize its efforts of containment within Mexican borders, starting
with the 1961 Latin American Peace Conference in Mexico City; and Lopez-Mateos could
maximize his role as a LITENSOR agent. AMCIGAR, as a microcosm for blatant international
action displaced into Mexico, represented a perfect fractal for why “Operation Zapata proved to
be a perfect failure… [including] brittle assumptions that the Guatemalan formula could be
transplanted to Cuba….And there was the much-noted inability of the Cubans to keep a
secret.”244
But this history involves the reevaluation of Mexico as a significant actor during the Cold
War, which included Lazaro Cardenas, a wild card. Because of Cardena’s highlighted solidarity
with the Cuban revolutionary spirit, “[i]n March 1961 [one month before the Bay of Pigs

240

Ibid., 106
Ibid., 106: “‘It seemed as though we could hear a sigh of relief from Los Pinos,’ the Mexican
presidential residence where Lopez Mateos lived.”
242
Ibid., 106
243
Ibid., 106
244
Ibid., 108
241

60

invasion], former Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas convened the Latin American Conference
for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace (or Latin American Peace
Conference). The gathering drew international attention to the miserable conditions in Latin
America, denounced the United States’ imperialist activities, and defended the Cuban
Revolution.”245 Lopez Mateos understood the pressures he would receive from both Cuba and
the CIA with regards to the conference. He was supposed to balance current benefits of
American imperialism with a historically anti-imperialist lineage and “sought to position his
administration as a kindred, though not communist, government.”246 Lopez Mateos understood
the reverence he was supposed to uphold for Cardenas, but also knew of the dangers
Cardenas247 posed to the stability of the PRI regime if he continued public support for Cuban
communists and riled up troublesome unions in addition to rising student movements. Los Pinos
also faced the prospect of resigning itself solely to the whims of the CIA. This was heavily felt
when Allen Dulles visited Scott’s Station in Mexico, declaring that “‘Cuba is now definitely
communist and it is a problem for all of Latin America as well as for the U.S.A.’ In other words,
the United States was expecting Mexico to help topple Castro [in Cuba].”248
Lopez-Mateos must have been able to sense the aggression and the desperation
emanating from his American colleagues and devised a single plan to address two problems. If
he could convince two major players within the CIA that “his domestic political problems were
real, including a communist-sponsored Latin American Peace Congress, upcoming negotiations
with the railway workers, and so forth [most likely referring to Cardenas]…”249 then he would
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preserve his eyes and ears on the ground, while additionally enforcing what he perceived as his
dominance in the PRI-CIA relationship. Lopez-Mateos was not out of his precarious situation
yet, as he had only dealt with half of the equation; now he had to strategize a favorable position
with the Cuban Government that would not jeopardize their previous arrangements with the
Americans. Thus Lopez-Mateos deflected his quandary onto the Mexican populous, as “‘[t]here
is a lot of sympathy for Castro and his revolution in Mexico. This factor has to be weighed by me
in all actions concerning Cuba. For this reason Mexico cannot take any overt action.’”250 In
addition Lopez-Mateos refreshed Scott and Dulles on Mexico’s neutral stance, since “Mexico
had a tradition of noninterference in the affairs of other nations.”251 It is unclear what the extent
was of Lopez-Mateos and the PRI’s knowledge of the Cuban counter invasion, and whether that
reinforced their decision to retreat from any overt involvement with the Bay of Pigs. The CIA did
not walk away empty handed from this exchange however. Precisely because the conversation
had been steered towards Mexican domestic policy, Scott and Dulles received a verbal
affirmation from the Lopez-Mateos administration towards unwavering political control over
communist subversion in Mexico City. In the end, “Lopez Mateos cited the Mexican constitution,
hastening to add that he would do whatever he could to help the CIA disrupt and hamper the
conference…[Additionally] the Mexicans did provide ‘under the table’ help to the CIA’s
campaign to overthrow Castro.”252 Aside from the integrated LI program, which necessitated a
renewed vigor in the wake of its newfound obligations in March 1961, this would also include
interim oil deals on behalf of Munro and Bolanos,253 and keeping a keen eye over Lazaro
Cardenas. It is remarkable how casual the encounter seems to have been between Dulles,
Scott, and Lopez-Mateos – more like a familial dispute, than a formal conference between
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representatives of two countries – leading one almost to forget that “[t]he CIA, not the State
Department, spoke for the U.S. government”254 and that the Mexican representative was not
merely some ambassador, but the sovereign head of state. It is this confusion of informality that
resulted in a waste of valuable resources in the planning of the Bay of Pigs, including Mexico
refusing covert support because of overt policy, further supported by Cardenas’s ploy in1961 to
declare international accord with Cuba.
The CIA’s station in Mexico City neatly settled their business, circumventing much of the
catastrophe of Operation Zapata, notwithstanding AMCIGAR. Unfortunately, one of the main
concerns of AMCIGAR operatives, “the much-noted inability of the Cubans to keep a secret,”255
came back to haunt Zapata, as the “White House, reporters and editors in Washington got word
in Miami that an invasion of Cuba was coming. Castro’s security forces already [now concretely]
knew it.”256 By the night of April 17, 1961, not only did the CIA operation collapse on itself in
execution – the Cuban Government halted them at every turn257 – but the most colossal failure
suffered was their inability to keep covert. “The agency had been stripped naked in public, its
secret operations obscenely on view. The agency’s humiliation was complete.”258 This would
leave such a deep scar on the CIA and would inflame paranoia to such an extent that Mexico
would only serve as the launch pad for a new covert empire that would not stop until all of Latin
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America “exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation
requires.”259 The CIA, which began shaky relations with the young Catholic president, would
hold Kennedy in contempt, despite the faulty foundations of Zapata, for never calling in
reinforcements in the face of an operational miscarriage.260 This was merely another layer
draped over a multidimensional temperament of overconfidence which mishandled Cuba to
such an exponential degree that the CIA essentially went into overdrive, and by late 1961 had
begun to serialize its policy of overthrowing Latin American governments, starting with
Ecuador.261 Calling directly on U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kim L. Scheppele’s
argument situates itself perfectly within the Cold War Latin American framework, stating “[an]
international state of emergency that requires other countries to make exceptions to both
international law and their constitutional orders.”262 Mexico for the moment, was safe, but the
overtly rejuvenated anti-capitalist and pro-Cuban consensus, as a response to both the Cuban
Revolution and the 1961 Peace Congress, would cause the country to follow its own trajectory.
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Chapter Five: Reorganizing the American State [1961-1962]

The Cuba fiasco demonstrated to the U.S. State Department and Castro that the
renewed CIA mission in Latin America had very definite limits and the spirit of revolution, foco,
still resonated strongly with a Latin American audience. The CIA once again found itself staring
into the precipice, which put Scott in an especially precarious position. In the worst-case
scenario, his six previous years of work would be dismantled, or, in a slightly better-case
scenario, passed off to another operative who did not understand any of the intricacies of
Mexico and Mexican relations. If his masterwork of intelligence craft was going to succeed, then
Scott had to overlook the functions of his field station offices. No more mistakes, no more
uncontrollable and incompatible foreign operatives. The CIA as a global institution had taken a
blow, but Scott could still salvage the prestige of his work in Mexico City. Scott must finally have
understood the full parameters that he could work within and around. It was clear from his
meeting with Dulles and Lopez-Mateos that ex-President Cardenas’s resurgence back into
public politics could rile up dissent where there need be none; clearly Mexico wanted to position
itself as victorious in its tripartite balancing act with Cuba and the United States. Lopez-Mateos
and the PRI had to recall their predecessors’ World War II strategy in which they shrewdly
played off the interests of Nazi Germany, Japan, and the United States, while remaining
uncompromised. As Renata Keller argues, “Mexico presented unique challenges and
opportunities for both its neighbors [U.S and Cuba], and the governments of all three countries
persistently pushed and tested each other in their efforts to maximize the benefits of Mexico’s
exceptional position.”263 Mexico provided enough incentive for Cuba, the United States, and the
Soviet Union to appear as if they could move unfettered. The trick ideally, was to choke the
threat before it became a national nuisance. How fortunate for Lopez-Mateos and Gobernacion
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Diaz-Ordaz that the CIA would mutually agree to root out domestic disturbances. The March
1961 Peace Congress was behind both the PRI and CIA, and though it had not been sabotaged
as hoped, it had left a distinct mark on both institutions. Now, both had a scapegoat, Cardenas,
in case his leftist solidarity necessitated armed conflict. Indispensably, because of Mexico’s
position as a negotiator, they could face off U.S. pressures and be the only Latin American
country to allow the hosting of Soviet and Cuban embassies.
Even though this irked the U.S. State Department, individuals like Winston Scott264 and
Adolfo Lopez-Mateos capitalized on this situation to elaborate their cooperative efforts to
achieve what many others could not: a surveillance program on communist targets more
comprehensive than any other in the world, which would include infiltration of those very same
Cuban and Soviet embassies. The LIMUST houses Scott had bought in his first two years in
Mexico City would finally operate in full swing. Another Cuba would never be allowed to happen
if Scott and the CIA could prevent it. It might be understandable why any information intercepted
pertaining to LI on communist activities, could falsely be extrapolated as global paranoia.
However, matters become muddled when the Cubans did indeed attempt to propagate the
spread of communist ideology in Mexico. A 1994 CIA Historical Review sheds insight into a
more or less standard viewpoint that was dominant through Cold War years: “Cuba plays a
central role in Soviet relations with Latin America not only as a dependent client serving
Moscow's interests but also as an independent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics.”265
Renata Keller furthers this position by contending that “Fidel Castro followed Adolfo Lopez
Mateos’s lead, and crafted contradictory overt and covert foreign policies toward Mexico...the
Cuban government used its embassy and consulates in Mexico to spread propaganda and
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possibly even to support revolutionary activities in Mexico and elsewhere.”266 Hyperbole like
myth, is rooted in truth; sometimes truth is also stranger than fiction.
As the latter half of 1961 passed after the Bay of Pigs disaster, the U.S. had an overt
trick up its sleeve: the Organization of American States. The famous “Declaration of Punta del
Este”267 of August 17, 1961 achieved a few important goals. First, it served as an excellent
public relations stunt for the Kennedy administration in terms of its ability to win back the good
graces of Latin America in a distinctly anti-American period. During this convention of various
Latin states, including Mexico, Kennedy’s proposed Alliance for Progress, a multibillion stimulus
package akin to the Marshall Plan, would act as a lifeline for many struggling countries, in
addition to presenting a more actively positive approach in Latin America affairs from the United
States. Second, it would function as a perfect cover for both American sponsored coups, like
Ecuador in 1961,268 as well as a legitimate subsidiary for military and technical support from the
CIA. Third, it would continue to reel Mexico back into the talons of the U.S. if they swung too far
left and would even incentivize members of the PRI to act against Lazaro Cardenas and other
radical leftists in order to retain their wealth and power. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly,
the declaration would ideologically persuade the rest of the OAS members to deny Cuba entry.
In this sense, August 17, 1961 would generally be viewed as a success. Back at the new
“embassy [which] had moved into a modern building on Reforma that announced the American
government’s presence much more openly than it ever had before,”269 Ambassador Thomas
Mann270 was not pleased with Mexico’s abstention in the OAS vote and thought that Mexico

266

Keller., 8-9
"Declaration of Punta Del Este; August 17, 1961." Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and
Diplomacy. Accessed April 17, 2018. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam15.asp.
268
The first half of Philip Agee’s CIA diary testifies to his direct involvement in Ecuador and Uruguay.
269
Morley., 112
270
Ibid., 113: “The new ambassador who succeeded Robert Hill.”
267

67

would cut ties with the United States to favor their new Soviet and Cuban contacts.271 Though
certainly a valid concern, Ambassador Mann must not have understood the depths of the
connections Scott had built and the scale of his surveillance programs; perhaps more
embarrassing was a fundamental misunderstanding of double dealing as a basic function of
Mexican politics.272 Mann’s interaction with Lopez Mateos on December 18, 1961 exemplifies
not only why Scott was the CIA’s main contact in Mexico, but the difficulty for American
diplomats in general in fathoming the inner machinations that gave Mexico its Cold War status.
In his summation of the meeting Mann states, “I commenced conversation by saying that I
recognized Mexican policy must be based on Mexico’s own estimate of its self-interest. On
other hand, I was sure he would understand vote in OAS plus projected visit created problem for
US...I said foregoing left my President difficult choice since I was certain he wished friendship
with Lopez Mateos, but on other hand had to consider US public opinion and interpretation…”273
Mann partly acknowledges Mexico’s right to self-determination in such international matters, but
appears to accept their OAS abstention at face value.274 Even when Mann acknowledges the
“absolute character Mexican doctrine non-intervention, I hoped he would understand importance
US give doctrine democracy also in OAS charter...”275 his reactions oscillate between
skepticism, denial, and delusion. He continues to assert, “We sincerely believe we are on side
of angels when we support right of people all countries chose their own government and when
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we say there is parallelism between peace and democracy.”276 Ironic, considering Scott’s
parallel work in the very same building, thus reaffirming how little Mann actually knew of CIA
operations in Mexico City.
When Kennedy, in the wake of the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress, planned a
state trip to Mexico in the following June of 1962,277 Scott demonstrated to Ambassador Mann
how integrated he was into Mexican society and Cold War politics: “Mann [officially] ceded
control of contacts with Lopez Mateos to the CIA. The CIA station chief, not the new
ambassador, was in charge of the U.S. relationship with the Mexican chief of state, an unusual
arrangement that would endure for years.”278 Scott had been cultivating his connections with
Los Pinos for at least six years, using George Munro as his liaison; it is still unclear how much
Scott informed the Ambassador of his operations, but if Mann had retained his functions, he
could have naively and counterintuitively unraveled Scott’s operations. Scott, even with the relief
of full control, still felt the pressures from the chain of command to ensure that Kennedy’s state
visit was successful, to stabilize discontent, and simultaneously to uphold his consignment
towards Lopez-Mateos and the PRI. Therefore, when Scott went to work at his Mexico City
station on Paseo Reforma “[e]ach day, he went to his neat modern desk and tended to the
complex task of covertly collecting intelligence…The CIA itself faced scrutiny and criticism like
never before. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had sworn to aides that he wanted to
splinter the agency into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.”279 Scott’s desideratum
was to remain unphased under all these pressures. How felicitous for him that Lopez-Mateos’s
PRI was just a table away and would enthusiastically support counter-surveillance in the city.280
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The respective Soviet and Cuban embassies would pose the synchronous challenge281 and
opportunity that would define Cold War counterintelligence. First, the challenge “[t]he Cubans
established [was how their] presence...opened up fraternal relationships with the embassies of
the communist bloc. The Cubans, in short, had broadened and deepened the KGB’s beachhead
in the Western Hemisphere.”282
Second, due to Scott’s earlier tenacity in establishing LITEMPO in 1958, he was
prepared to meet the challenge head on with Lopez-Mateos, and even surpass expectations in
1962. From the ashes of AMCIGAR and the Bay of Pigs, PRI-CIA operations kept constant tabs
on passenger manifests travelling to and from Cuba. Through their street operatives, LopezMateos and Scott photographically surveilled the Cuban embassy like hawks within Project
LIPSTICK/LIEMPTY. The DFS-CIA collaboration preparations would, in the months leading up
to Kennedy’s state visit in June 1962, additionally serve as a catalytic backdoor to implement
long-term domestic surveillance throughout Mexico City. The state visit would become the
imperative test in judging the CIA’s cooperative capacity to continuously stage, collect, and
execute functions for a high value target. Vitally, Scott devised two general methods for
intercepting all communications pertaining to Mexico City: LIFEAT for wiretapping and LIMUD
for mail interception. Now Scott needed civilians who could readily inform on young communist
upstarts who would “‘agitate the general public, to obtain national and international publicity, and
to provoke brutal repression on such a scale as to embarrass both the Mexican government and
its guest.”283 The DFS would be too crass for this matter and had the potential to shatter the
international image of the PRI’s Mexico if a massacre took place. Scott subsequently initiated
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his LIMOTOR284 surveillance for university students, and LIEVICT for radical Catholic anticommunists.285 If the American president was to wade into murky waters, there had to be
absolutely no direct threat emanating from the Cuban and Soviet embassies, therefore Scott
also incorporated sedentary programs like the triplets of LILYRIC, LICALLA, and LIMITED, as
well as LIERODE/LIONION; and nomadic reconnaissance protocols like LIJERSEY/LIRICE and
LIENTRAP would shadow targets of interest. LITESNOR and LITEMPO agents could provide
auxiliary assistance through their approval of visas of Cuban emigres, which not only served as
a tantamount source of intelligence,286 but also granted LITEMPOs and the PRI valuable agency
within the U.S.-Mexican power dynamic. The byproduct of this perceived sovereignty was the
dispelling of any notion that the Mexican Government had any significant presupposition to the
U.S.287 It certainly makes sense why “[t]he Mexico City station was clearly the best in the
Western Hemisphere...and probably one of the best in the world. The station was aggressive
and well-managed....The technical facilities and capabilities were extraordinary and impressive.
The results could be quantified. Win’s staff had produced no fewer than 722 intelligence reports
in the past year, 45 percent of which came from telephone tap operations.”288
Because of Scott’s surveillance, he knew what type of unrest would erupt days before
Kennedy touched down in Mexico City; he was prepared. He called for all hands to be on deck,
including the personal involvement of LITEMPO-4,289 his longtime friend, Captain Gutiérrez
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Barrios. Perhaps it was Scott’s ability to exploit all disposable resources, or a more personal
faith towards Mexican Intelligence Services, DFS, to step up and successfully preserve order290
during a critical, public spectacle of peaceful international affairs.291 Kennedy’s visit to Mexico
represented a greater symbolic act than reparations for his host, but a prospective new
orientation for hemispheric cohesion in the overt and covert domains. The Alliance for Progress
would also sinisterly imply an Alliance for Subversion, and thus “the ideological struggle
between the United States and Cuba was joined in the heart of Mexico City. After the
embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy wanted to present his Alliance for Progress as the
benign face of American power willing to help the people of Latin America.”292 Kennedy’s work
in Mexico City would indeed provide the PRI the opportunity to “derive great benefits from
President Kennedy’s visit…In the name of the continuing Mexican Revolution…[and maintain]
absolute control over the political life of the country...’”293 As a result of their efforts, Kennedy’s
trip was a resounding success, ultimately serving to reinforce the saccadic mask of overt
friendship, covert operations, and accordingly allow LITENSOR and LITEMPOS to double deal.
Only three months after the conclusion of Kennedy’s trip to Mexico, in October 1962,
Cuba once again became an international lynchpin in the Cold War grenade. This does not
imply a stillbirth of global international operations however, which unconditionally escalated after
1959,294 merely the direct pertinence of Scott’s work with LITENSOR/LITEMPO and their role in
shaping its de-escalation. Without Lopez-Mateos, Diaz-Ordaz, and the connections of the PRI,
the Cuban Missile Crisis might have taken a much different direction. History tends to remember
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Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, and Fidel Castro as the principal negotiators, but Mexico played
an invaluable role in “[resisting] U.S pressure to break relations with Cuba, and how they
navigated such threats to national and hemispheric stability as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962
[and eventually] Kennedy’s assassination in 1963.”295 It is difficult to assert whether or not the
U.S. State Department admitted the opportunity factored by Mexican neutrality and its double
dealing into Kennedy’s negotiations, but considering the thin line that already separated
thermonuclear annihilation and relative peace,296 it was likely indispensable.
When U.S intelligence agencies “confirmed that missile bases under construction in the
Cuban countryside were designed for Soviet long-range nuclear missiles…”297 Scott’s
immediate reaction was to consult his friend Lopez-Mateos, LITENSOR, and Diaz-Ordaz,
LITEMPO-2, to gauge how their response advantaged them in their negotiations between
October 16 and October 28. Evidently, “[a]s the crisis went on, his friendship with the
LITEMPOs proved valuable.”298 The challenge in concretely supporting these assertions is
hampered due to the scarcity of available evidence.299 One can temporarily circumscribe this
issue by using constructed evidence presented thus far. Mexico established itself as capable of
pulling the strings of both Cuba and the United States and a country which seemingly valued
self-preservation as its highest priority. By no means would Mexico endorse another invasion of
Cuba, but neither would it condone the Soviets covertly supporting their ideological brethren in a
M.A.D. manner. The lack of Cuban and Soviet embassy audio-surveillance, or even an indirect
allusion gained through LIENVOY and LIROMANCE, could further indicate that no such
programs existed or the information remains classified. Meanwhile, Diaz-Ordaz declared “that
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Mexico always supported Cuba’s right to have defensive weapons, but these missiles were
clearly Russian-controlled offensive weapons, which could threaten the United States, or
Mexico, for that matter. Díaz Ordaz called Lopez Mateos, who stated the same position publicly.
Win’s friendship with both men helped ensure statements favorable to Washington’s position.”300
This stance is further corroborated in a 1964 conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and
Diaz-Ordaz,301 and could indicate an untapped reservoir of collusion. Nonetheless the “strategic
impact of CIA man’s [David Phillip, but one must assume it is equally applicable to Scott]
audacious work and confirming his unseen influence on the Kennedy administration’s Cuba
policy.”302 Logic thus follows that if Scott’s intelligence helped release tensions from the crisis,
and his work was dependent on LITEMPO and other base LI operations in Mexico, then their
ability to somehow feed the CIA just enough information to dissuade Kennedy from starting a
third world war is remarkable. More research on this matter will be conducted in the future.
This is notwithstanding that the CIA viewed that “Kennedy’s handling of the missile crisis
had [only] postponed the Cuba problem, not solved it.”303 It was too close a call with irrevocable
stakes. At least it was no Bay of Pigs. But this necessitated another level of penetrative
espionage and infiltration, supported by LITENSOR, but involving data collection sourced from
their enemies and analyzed by CIA technicians. Sometime between Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Scott implemented a system called Project LIENVOY and
LIROMANCE, most likely using double agents code-named LINILE, to plant audio-surveillance
devices, LICOOL, in both the Cuban and Soviet embassies. Scott now had omnipotent control
in Mexico City, and “vigilant control of every aspect of the station’s operations. No one could
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have known at the time that...Win Scott...would come to play a central role in the massive
intelligence failure, still obfuscated by CIA secrecy four decades later, that would culminate in
the murder of President Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963.”304

304

Ibid., 152

75

Chapter Six: November 22 [1963-1964]

November 22, 1963, perfectly exemplifies how successful functions can fall prey to
systemic failure. From prevention to investigation, Scott’s ubiquitous LI program somehow
suffered an aneurysm in which surveillance equipment suddenly malfunctioned, and intelligence
disappeared. Too many coincidences, and spontaneous lapses in judgment and
professionalism, present a picture of an amateur hack job, not a carefully crafted masterwork of
counterintelligence that would risk international scandal if the UN or Soviet Allied countries
discovered that an American violated Mexico’s “neutrality” and sovereignty, delegating three of
its heads of state to informant status. Regardless of the complexities of LI’s Cold War realities,
the perception would fundamentally ruin the PRI and the CIA. Especially pertaining to Lee
Harvey Oswald, Kennedy’s alleged killer, “[i]t was not a tale of conspiracy or of a ‘lone nut’ but a
saga that eluded all five official investigations of Kennedy’s assassination and all the hundreds
of writers who had explored the subject.”305 It becomes particularly hard to fathom how the
acumen of audio-visual evidence306 between the CIA, FBI and the DFS about Oswald, let alone
other potential targets, would become so misinterpreted and perverted in the sham called the
Warren Commission.307
All the loose ends and intelligence malfunctions of bureaucracy easily invite rampant
speculation and conspiracy theories about third men. This is not the goal of this investigation,
however; it is merely to query such a radically antithetical CIA performance during a steadfast
improvement in global efficacy. Oswald thus becomes a fulcrum for this analysis, partly because
his movements preceding his arrival in Mexico were less than subdued, including work for the
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Soviets and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which indisputably landed him on the radar of
both the CIA and FBI.308 In fact, “Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention of four different CIA
collection operations...AMSPELL, LIERODE, LIENVOY, and LIEMPTY.”309 Matters once again
become complicated when Scott himself contradicts the Warren Commission's claims, despite
an infallible memory, that any and all information collected between September 27 and October
2 1963 “‘concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: US
Ambassador Thomas C. Mann.’”310 Scott’s Mexico City station reputation was not hyperbole
however, particularly in regard to embassy surveillance and he “had a hard-won reputation for
knowing everything about the Cuban embassy. His operations were designed to ensure that
every phone line was tapped, every visitor photographed. The Warren Commission’s statement
implied the station had failed in one of its strongest areas. Win rejected the notion.”311
Despite some of Scott’s memory lapses, the data collected by LIERODE and LIENVOY
spoke a very different story312 to the State Department’s official narrative. Scott’s surveillance
captured Oswald in Mexico City on September 27, 1963, attempting to gain visas from both the
Soviet and Cuban embassies, “passing for a fifth time through the viewfinder of the newly
installed LIERODE camera...”313 as opposed to the idea that they were “‘malfunctioning or
something.’”314 This particular malfunction “did not happen until October 1, according to
[Scott].”315 Oswald’s visits to these establishments would further be substantiated by LIENVOY
transcripts, first when Sylvia Duran, a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy exchanged
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words with a representative of the Soviet embassy and then on October 1, when Oswald placed
a call to the Soviet embassy to schedule a visit with KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich.316 As one
of Scott’s key officers, Anne Goodpasture noted, “[t]he caller had mentioned [Oswald’s] name.
That was the key, said Goodpasture.”317 This situation was precisely a microcosm of day-to-day
operations under Scott’s jurisdiction including its expediency and method. “The CIA tape of the
Oswald call was marked ‘urgent’ and delivered to the station within fifteen minutes.”318 This was
the stakes of a program like LIENVOY; any information had to be collected and categorized in a
timely manner in case of another Cuban Revolution or Missile Crisis. Due to the nature of
counterintelligence, Goodpasture “knew, especially [to] duplicate [the] tape of Oswald’s October
1 call to the Soviet embassy…”319 Likewise, Project LIEMPTY was instructed to “photograph all
persons who approached the [Soviet] guardhouse.”320 The very notion that LI failed to report
Oswald’s activities in Mexico is an area up for debate, but considering Scott’s personal stakes in
supporting his station’s success, that proposition321 is unconvincing. Scott’s determination to
uphold American values by any means at any cost would serve as his modus operandi during
his tenure at the agency. An individual creating waves as explicitly as Oswald would, in the
general Cold War context, become a prime target as a communist subversive.
Equally impressive was Scott’s coordination with Gobernacion Diaz-Ordaz and his subsecretary, Luis Echeverria, future Mexican president and LITEMPO-8322 to track down any leads
and conduct interrogations on citizens who had even a remote connection to Oswald. They
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were to use aggressive tactics in their investigations to extract every last shred of evidence. For
example, individuals like Sylvian Duran, who was “to be held incommunicado until she gave all
her details of her contacts with Oswald...Within an hour, President Lopez Mateos called...his
friend wanted to share intelligence.”323 Scott would make a concerted effort to gather anything
he could get his hands on and relay this information to the necessary individuals as soon as he
could. Either because of his own personal pride or his professional oath towards his country –
he would never deliberately mishandle information – Scott “was a vigilant and accomplished
anti-communist who was unlikely to conceal intelligence, deliberately or accidentally, about a
pro-communist, pro-Castro troublemaker who sought to violate U.S law [in the wake of the 1963
Cuban Embargo324] by visiting Cuba.”325 Accordingly, after consolidating the information for the
next week, “on October 8 Scott was ready to report to headquarters about Oswald. He had a
transcript from LIENVOY, [and] a photograph from LIEMPTY...Scott sent [a]...cable to CIA
headquarters.”326
At what point in the information train did Scott’s transmission of his intelligence get lost,
and by whom? The hierarchy of CIA organization appears to have existed to retain order in the
covert chaos; at the same time, different branches could effortlessly bury certain information if
needed. Clearly, enough of the fundamentals seeped through in order to briskly craft 888 pages
that would exclusively spin evidence, ultimately framing Oswald as the sole patsy327 involved in
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the assassination. As it turned out, “[t]he record shows that top officials digested the information
on Oswald with care and deliberation.”328 Where did the photographs of Oswald end up?
Considering that “[n]o CIA surveillance photographs of Oswald have ever surface[d]”,329
someone in the chain of command must have had a distinct reason for making sure they never
saw the light of day.
Was it the concern that Lyndon B. Johnson and the might of “United States [might]
attack Cuba in retaliation for the murder of [Kennedy]?”330 What was the explanation for “the
CIA…[destroying] the tapes in 1986”?331 Perhaps it was that the CIA “did not much care for
Win’s account because it called into question the agency’s position that Oswald was but a blip in
their eyes.”332 There appears to be a black box of causal links that do not appear to connect to
anything. If the idea was to halt Scott’s station work in Mexico, it certainly failed, since PRI-CIA
operations to stabilize Mexican domestic politics in the face of communist subversion would
remain fully operational, even as Lopez-Mateos’s sexennio ended and Diaz-Ordaz’s began in
late 1964. Oswald would cease to provide any more answers for the CIA and for historians after
being assassinated by Jack Ruby on November 24, 1963. Clearly there were some insights
Scott kept to himself during the rest of his tenure in Mexico City, judging by the speed with
which “[t]he agency [took] possession of [Scott’s work after his death in 1970]...a stack of tapes
three of four inches thick...marked ‘Oswald’...[including] The treasure in the trove...a 221-page
manuscript entitled ‘It Came to Me’. The story that Win Scott told in those pages displeased and
disturbed his longtime friends in CIA headquarters, including Angleton and the director of
Central Intelligence himself, Richard Helms...the agency had dodged a proverbial bullet.”333
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The Kennedy assassination and investigation leaves many questions unanswered to this
day. The most pressing insight is a startling lack of closure, despite what the Warren
Commission claims. Scott, despite shepherding the CIA-PRI alliance into LITEMPO-2’s
sexennio in 1964, thus continuing a distinctly intense battle for stability, would never back down
from the claim that “his people had watched Oswald everywhere he went in Mexico City and
reported everything to Washington.”334 The incontrovertible challenge with studying the covert
world however, is wading through the perspectives and motives of individuals whose very
business is to withhold truths in ever varying degrees – or maybe their affairs never allowed
them the luxury even of that.
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Conclusion: The Show Must Go On [1964-1970 and Beyond]

The Kennedy assassination and investigation created a vortex of confusion within
intelligence communities around the world.335 Which individuals were connected with whom? At
what point did they visit certain locations? And how would this dictate alliances and the pace of
covert action? Cold War counterintelligence was only in its first decade, and the bloodiest, most
frantic operations were yet to come. In Mexico City, Scott still had a country to co-manage, and
two sexennios to smoothly usher in: that of Gustavo Diaz-Ordaz from 1964 to 1970, and Luis
Echeverria-Alvarez from 1970 to 1976. Scott himself would pass away in 1970, and control of
his field station would transfer to John Horton in 1971, who would attempt to uphold its
functions. Diaz-Ordaz’s work as LITEMPO-2 would critically define the PRI-CIA relations as
quashing alleged Cuban influence through the catalyst of urban dissent – the result of a
massive rural to urban shift. This served as the backdrop to much of late 1950s through to the
1970s and would jumpstart massive industrial growth. “The consequent achievement of stability
has thus come to be hailed as the political component of the post-war 'Mexican miracle'.”336
The reputed miracle, in light of evidence that has been resurfacing over the last decade,
was really a byproduct of Scott’s LI initiative, though credit must still be given to the PRI for the
post-World War II subservience of its army, state officials, and mandatory unionization337 as a
means of stabilization. This glorious economic growth338 served as an additional factor that
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strengthened the duality of Mexico’s saccadic mask over its citizens and international
communities. In the self-effacing task of understanding the imposition of international politics in
a domestic arena between 1950 and 1970 however, certain staples of Mexican politics were
excluded, “like the railway strikes of 1958-9…[by the] railway-workers' union, the Sindicato de
Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Republica (STFRM).”339 The tug of war between the unions
and Diaz-Ordaz would plague his rather unremarkable presidency and “[u]nlike Lopez Mateos,
who managed to blend coercion with an artful dose of co-optation, Diaz Ordaz tended to rely on
force and discipline alone.”340 Whether this aggressive shift stemmed from Diaz-Ordaz or
Winston Scott is unclear, even with evidence presented by the National Security Archives and
Jefferson Morley’s book, Our Man in Mexico. Which was the chicken and which the egg? What
remains clear is that this adjustment suited this new stage in the PRI-CIA relationship within the
Cold War timeline, when Western anti-communism was more than an outlook; it was an
imposition and a testament of political machismo, and the fastest way to garner alliances with
U.S. agencies. The PRI’s mastery of double dealing, especially through its geography as a
staging ground for Lyndon B Johnson’s and Castro’s governments, would heat up Cold War
relations341 while still vowing “an ideological solidarity with Zapata, Villa and other major figures
of the Revolution, and [asserting] Mexico's sovereignty from the United States, still in the grip of
the Cold War.”342
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Cardenas’s symbolic power had more of a tangible influence in Mexican politics than the
PRI, and evidently Scott would find this acceptable.343 The trick in retaining the saccadic mask
was in straddling the zone “comfortable with the consensus and order that the one-party
Mexican political system prized. ‘Liberty is fruitful only when it is accompanied by order’ [LopezMateos] declared in his inaugural address. He described his government as one of the ‘extreme
left within the constitution’... He espoused the egalitarian ideals of the Mexican Revolution, if
only rhetorically.”344 Retaining this perception would become an obsession for PRI and the pride
of Diaz-Ordaz, and his tactless method in dealing with unions and leftist students continuously
contributed to his short temper. Having won the bid as host for the 1968 Olympics, he would
have to present Mexico City as immaculate, sending his bellicose personality into overdrive.
Mere weeks before the opening ceremony, on October 2, 1968, Diaz-Ordaz would snap345 and
order the deaths of roughly 400 students at Plaza de las Tres Culturas. “Without advance
warning, white-gloved security agents waved in security forces that opened fire on the helpless
crowd. At least two thousand demonstrators were placed under arrest. An official report
admitted forty-nine people were killed; a New York Times correspondent placed the death toll at
more like two hundred, with hundreds of others wounded. It was a brutal massacre, since
remembered as Mexico's contemporary noche triste ('sad night').”346 The saccadic mask was
officially shattered, but whereas in the Oswald investigation, in which too much loose
information led nowhere or was deliberately buried by intelligence or State Department
bureaucracy on both sides of the border, the Tlatelolco Massacre illustrates a sudden aloofness,
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about which a shockingly little amount of cohesive information is known.347 Recent reinvestigations are currently being conducted within archives in Mexico and hopefully Central
Intelligence reports from the Freedom of Information. Tlatelolco is certainly worth of its own
dedicated paper, where one must ask whether it was just another blunder in the annals of the
PRI-CIA relationship, or a carefully calculated trial ushering Mexico into the fold of Latin
American dirty wars and state terrorism?
Perhaps it was the product of a changing of the guard. Scott’s passing ended an era of
classic intelligence cooptation, in addition to a much more independently minded LITEMPO-8,
who worried less about upholding a perception of excellence and instead was more oriented to
overt displays of power. The efficacy of the PRI-CIA relationship through the 1950s and 1960s
hinged on Scott’s understanding of friendship politics and the machinations of the Mexican
conglomeration – the PRI. The introduction of Richard Nixon348 and Henry Kissinger into the
equation would shift the personal relationships away from the CIA station chiefs, and more
towards the Commander-in-Chief, taking Chilean and Argentine relations in the 1970s as a
frame of reference. What role then did the CIA play in the second phase of the Mexican “Dirty
War”349 of the 1970s? Quite serious guerrilla movements sprouted in Guerrero state, which set
the stage for the low-intensity dirty war – low-intensity in comparison to policies in Argentina and
Chile. Mexico provided diplomatic support to the Sandinistas during the Nicaraguan Revolution
in 1979. How did this affect CIA operations in the country? The Sandinista question was a
retread of the Cuba situation from the 1960s; support for a revolutionary movement seeking
regional independence from U.S. dominance through the overthrow of a U.S.-backed dictator.
The already murky insight into the degree to which the Mexican state consented to international
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alliances that might have reduced its claim to sovereignty and dedication to nationalism; and the
ways in which international relationships and significant events occurred in Mexico that had
wider global impacts than have been previously known, expected, or assumed, drastically
switch tracks, but subsequently arrive at the same conclusion: self-preservation, but at what
cost?
Current capabilities prevent one from properly answering these questions within the
twenty-year LI-nearity, as the title would suggest; nor does an omnipotent dissection of the
global events spanning LITENSOR’s sexennio provide a conclusion, as is the reality of the
paper. There is always more to scrutinize. At this juncture, this body of work serves as a
launchpad for future exploration of a distinctly intricate world of espionage, conjoining more
international perspectives, particularly primary and secondary sources written by Mexicans, and
elaborating and expanding on sources used thus far. This project hopes to simultaneously shed
light on Mexico’s active involvement within a Cold War geopolitical history, at the direct,
technical expense of its nationalist identity. Informality assisted in repulsing a unilateral
relationship, but Scott’s ingenuity was illegal;350 its perception not so much, considering its
covert nature. This serves as a testament towards a U.S. outlook which disregards the sanctity
of international law, and a blatant distrust and disrespect towards Latin American countries.
Scott’s example however, exposes the extent to which history cannot be taught and
compartmentalized. Here, the DNA of domestic politics inherently intertwines with international
arenas and vice versa, confounding an already complex biography of power. If sovereignty is
the power to enforce laws, who was sovereign and how can this sovereignty transpose itself to
the rest of the Cold War? Who really was the man in Mexico? Might one ever unravel a definite
truth, or will it continue to be obfuscated by those in power who hold it?
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